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ARBITRATION AND THE INDIVIDUATION 
CRITIQUE 
W. Mark C. Weidemaier∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Skeptics and champions of the use of arbitration for consumer and 
employment disputes do not agree about much, but each group views arbitration as 
an individuated dispute resolution process. Many skeptics view arbitration as a tool 
used by repeat-player businesses to combat the increased influence of the 
plaintiffs’ bar. To a significant extent, that influence derives from lawyers’ ability 
to aggregate claims in both formal and informal ways.1 Skeptics object that 
businesses use arbitration to prevent such aggregation, forcing consumer and 
employee claimants into individualized proceedings where neither they nor their 
lawyers can counter the advantages enjoyed by more powerful repeat players. I 
call this the “individuation critique.” In reply, arbitration proponents defend its 
fairness as a forum and advance efficiency arguments in its favor, but they do not 
suggest that arbitration could or should facilitate the aggregation of consumer and 
employee claims. 
This article calls into question skeptics’ and proponents’ shared 
conception of arbitration. In Part I, I describe the individuation critique, which 
derives from Professor Marc Galanter’s famous distinction between repeat players 
(those who routinely encounter the same issue in litigation) and one-shotters (those 
with only sporadic and unpredictable contact with the legal system).2 The 
arbitration debate often focuses on disputes between “one-shot” consumer or 
employee claimants and repeat-player businesses as respondents, and that is the 
type of dispute I am concerned with here. 
I view the individuation critique, at least in theory, as one of the more 
potent objections to the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements between parties 
                                                                                                                
    ∗ Assistant Professor of Public Law and Government, University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. For helpful comments and discussion on prior drafts, thanks to 
Scott Baker, John Conley, Laura Cooper, Jill Family, Adam Feibelman, Elizabeth Gibson, 
Mitu Gulati, Melissa Jacoby, Bill Marshall, Hiroshi Motomura, Richard Myers, Jean 
Sternlight, and to workshop participants at the University of Wisconsin Law School. 
    1. See infra text accompanying notes 35–54. 
    2. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
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of unequal power.3 Yet as a description of current arbitration practice, the critique 
is of uncertain validity. First, the critique takes largely for granted that arbitration 
agreements routinely include individuating terms, such as terms that prohibit class 
actions, prevent arbitrators from awarding punitive damages, or require that 
arbitration results remain confidential. To be sure, such agreements do exist, and 
they may be particularly common in some industries, but it is not clear that the 
critique accurately describes consumer and employment arbitration agreements 
generally. 
Second, the critique arguably pays too much attention to arbitration 
agreements themselves, and too little attention to the institutional context in which 
arbitration takes place. In particular, arbitration providers like the American 
Arbitration Association (“AAA”) and JAMS have adopted “due process” standards 
that may significantly improve the “fairness” of arbitration procedure. If 
consistently interpreted and enforced (we do not know if they are), these standards 
may limit the impact of some individuating contract terms. In short, a number of 
unanswered empirical questions are relevant to the individuation critique, 
including questions about the contents of arbitration agreements and the role of 
arbitration providers in shaping arbitration procedure. Systematic analysis of these 
questions may reveal the critique to be overstated. 
Moreover, a full assessment of the individuation critique requires more 
than an understanding of current arbitration practices. We should also consider 
arbitration’s potential as a forum for aggregate dispute resolution. Relying in part 
on evidence from the recent, and rather unusual, phenomenon of class arbitration, I 
argue in Part II that arbitration may have significant potential, especially for 
consumers.4 I begin by discussing class arbitration. 
In class arbitration, an arbitrator selected and paid by the parties, rather 
than an elected or appointed judge, presides over a class action. The arbitrator 
decides whether to certify a class, determines the form and manner of notice to 
class members, resolves all issues of law and fact, and enters an award that may 
bind many hundreds or thousands of class members. This wholesale privatization 
of justice is subject only to limited judicial review. A rare occurrence until the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,5 over 120 class 
arbitrations are now pending before the AAA.6 
Both the legal literature and the alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) 
providers involved in administering class arbitrations tend to view these 
                                                                                                                
    3. A predispute arbitration agreement is a contract that obliges the parties to 
submit future disputes to binding arbitration. 
    4. I use the term “consumer” to refer to individuals who assert relatively small-
value claims, typically not for personal injuries, arising from standardized transactions for 
credit, services, or goods intended for personal or household use. 
    5. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
    6. Unlike most arbitrations, the AAA class arbitrations are quasi-public. Many 
of the arbitrators’ decisions, and many of the arbitration agreements themselves, are 
available on the AAA website. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Class Arbitration Docket, 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). 
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proceedings as little more than a private version of the judicial class action.7 So 
narrow a conception fails to take seriously the possibilities of class arbitration. As I 
will explain, in many cases arbitrators will have the authority to resolve, in 
collective fashion, large-scale disputes that would have to proceed separately, if at 
all, in court. I argue that arbitrators should use this authority and that, at least in 
some circumstances, properly administered class arbitration might be acceptable 
both to claimants and respondents. I conclude this discussion by arguing that 
proponents and skeptics of arbitration should each embrace the aggregative 
possibilities of class arbitration. 
Arbitration’s potential to facilitate aggregation is not limited to formal 
methods like class arbitration. Thus, Part II also describes how arbitration might 
facilitate aggregation of individual consumer claims in informal ways. For 
example, although arbitrators generally do not create precedent and are not bound 
by other arbitrators’ decisions, evidence from the AAA class arbitrations suggests 
that they may be strongly influenced by other arbitration awards in similar cases.8 
Indeed, under the right conditions, arbitrators may produce something akin to 
informal precedent, and this possibility may encourage plaintiffs’ lawyers to invest 
in creating “rules” from which multiple claimants can benefit. Part II goes on to 
suggest some reforms to ADR provider policies that might encourage specialized, 
repeat-player lawyers to accept cases destined for arbitration and to make 
meaningful investments in these disputes. For individual consumers in particular, 
such a system might prove to be superior to the courts in important respects. 
I. THE INDIVIDUATION CRITIQUE 
As I have explained, the individuation critique derives from Marc 
Galanter’s distinction between repeat players and one-shotters.9 Forests have gone 
to the blade discussing Galanter’s taxonomy of litigants,10 so my treatment of it in 
this section will be brief. I focus primarily on the extent to which repeat players 
benefit from their ability to aggregate claims. 
A. Automatic Claims Aggregation and the Presumed Repeat-Player Advantage 
For a number of reasons, even a formally neutral legal system may favor 
repeat players, both in individual cases and over the long term.11 Repeat players 
can justify significant investments in lobbying and other activities designed to 
shape the law,12 and they learn from experience how to structure transactions to 
                                                                                                                
    7. See infra text accompanying notes 142–143 and note 153. 
    8. See infra text accompanying notes 197–206. 
    9. Galanter, supra note 2. For another important article on repeat players in 
arbitration, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative 
Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19 (1999), 
suggesting that repeat players in ADR may duplicate, or enhance, the advantages they enjoy 
in litigation and calling for research into ADR outcomes and procedures. 
  10. For a useful bibliography, see Brian J. Glenn, The Varied and Abundant 
Progeny, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 371, 373–74 
(Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003). 
  11. Galanter, supra note 2, at 103–04. 
  12. Id. at 100. 
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their advantage.13 If a dispute occurs, the repeat player may seek to generate a 
favorable precedent14 or, conversely, to suppress rule changes that might benefit 
future adversaries. To that end, a repeat-player defendant might settle weak cases 
and litigate only those it expects to win.15 If it does litigate, the defendant may 
make substantial investments in its defense for a number of reasons. For one thing, 
it may invest because the result has consequences for future cases.16 Likewise, the 
defendant may spend heavily on, say, developing expert witnesses and planning 
legal strategy, because it can spread these costs, and reap the benefits, over 
multiple cases.17 The result is that, in many cases, repeat players will rationally 
make litigation investments that no individual litigant can hope to match.18 
In part, this reality reflects the fact that defendants automatically 
aggregate claims presenting common legal and factual questions: 
Faced with numerous actual and potential claims presenting 
common questions of liability and damages . . . , the defendant 
always, naturally and necessarily, prepares one defense for all of 
those claims, litigating from the posture of a de facto class 
action . . . . With class-wide aggregation of the defense interest, the 
defendant exploits economies of scale to invest far more cost-
                                                                                                                
  13. Id. at 98, 109. 
  14. By “precedent,” I mean not only published judicial opinions, but also any 
information of systemic value in similar cases. For example, a defense verdict, or one 
producing a modest damages award, might temper future plaintiffs’ settlement expectations. 
Conversely, a large award might increase settlement expectations, encourage more lawsuits, 
or generate an unfavorable reaction from the financial markets. 
  15. Galanter, supra note 2, at 101–02; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 273–74 (1979) (noting that, in cases 
where litigants have asymmetric future stakes, “a necessary condition for a trial is that the 
odds favor the party with the greater stake”). As another example, a repeat-player defendant 
might allow a case to reach a jury without raising a key defense, because it anticipates an 
adverse ruling and does not wish to generate unfavorable precedent. Cf. Catherine Albiston, 
The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing By Winning, 33 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 869, 877–85 (1999) (describing various “rule-making” opportunities in the 
litigation process, including strategic settlement, dispositive motions at the trial court level, 
and appeal). 
  16. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 100 (noting significance to repeat player of 
events that will influence outcomes in future cases). 
  17. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have 
and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 399–402 (2000). Note, too, that defense 
costs are also investments in reputation: by conveying its willingness to fight each claim 
tooth and nail the defendant may deter future claims or reduce their expected value. See 
Galanter, supra note 2, at 99; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 27 (noting value to 
repeat player of cultivating a reputation as a bargainer or litigator). 
  18. E.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” 
Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1384 
(2000); Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 401; William C. Whitford, Structuring Consumer 
Protection Legislation to Maximize Effectiveness, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1018, 1020 (1981). 
This is not to say that repeat players will always out-invest one-shotters, only that they will 
often have the ability and incentive to do so. 
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effectively in preparing its side of the case than plaintiffs can in 
preparing their side.19 
Substantial litigation investments should pay off by permitting litigants to develop 
and deploy legal strategies that increase their odds of success. This advantage 
persists even in the face of positive law that seems to favor a less-resourced 
adversary.20 Put baldly, “[a]dverse legal doctrine defeats only those who believe it 
can. For nonbelievers, the strategic application of resources can construct 
outcomes to order, within cultural limits.”21 Whether or not one accepts that legal 
indeterminacy permits well-resourced parties to “construct outcomes to order,” 
parties who invest more in litigation will likely see superior results, especially 
across a class of similar cases.22 
Galanter’s article spawned a vast body of scholarship,23 including studies 
searching for evidence of a repeat-player effect. Though the evidence is somewhat 
mixed, studies generally support the existence of at least a modest advantage for 
repeat players before trial24 and appellate25 courts, in the development of 
precedent,26 and, possibly, in arbitration as well.27 
                                                                                                                
  19. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 393–94. Although Professor Rosenberg focuses 
on mass torts, he recognizes that his argument applies to many consumer and employment 
disputes. Id. at 393 n.1. Indeed, a defendant need not be faced with a classic mass tort—in 
the sense of a fairly cohesive litigation presenting a common set of injuries resulting from 
exposure to a mass-produced product—in order to aggregate claims. Defendants have 
similar incentives whenever faced with present or potential future claims involving 
recurrent factual or legal issues. For a parallel discussion describing the tendency towards 
informal aggregation in much of American tort law, see Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian 
Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort 
Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004). 
  20. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 
49 DUKE L.J. 1405, 1480–82 (2000). 
  21. Id. at 1480–81. 
  22. Repeat-player advantages include expertise, ready access to specialized legal 
representation, and “trust and legitimacy” with institutional players like judges and clerks of 
court. Legal rules are not self-executing, and repeat players can better monitor the officers 
and agencies charged with their implementation. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 98–99, 103, 
109; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 27–28 & n.44. In short, “Repeat players initiate the 
play, enjoy economies of scale, develop facilitative informal relations, have access to client-
specialized legal representation, play the odds in their repetitive engagements, and with 
regard to the rules of the game, play for rule-changes as much, or perhaps more than, for 
immediate gains.” Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The Significance of Knowing that the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD?, 
supra note 10, at 273, 273. These advantages may also enhance repeat players’ leverage in 
informal negotiations. E.g., Gary Goodpaster, Lawsuits as Negotiations, NEGOTIATION J., 
July 1992, at 221, 231–33; see generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: 
UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION (1991). 
  23. See Glenn, supra note 10. 
  24. E.g., Donald R. Songer, Reginald S. Sheehan & Susan Brodie Haire, Do the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead over Time?: Applying Galanter’s Framework to Decisions of the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925–1988, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT 
AHEAD?, supra note 10, at 85; Craig Wanner, The Public Ordering of Private Relations: 
Part II: Winning Civil Court Cases, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 293, 300–05 (1975); see also 
74 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 49:69 
B. Repeat-Player Lawyers and the Benefits of Aggregation 
Something is missing from this picture: lawyers. Lawyers are often repeat 
players,28 indeed the only ones involved in many cases.29 In such cases, any repeat-
player advantage may result from “the repeat play of the large law firm lawyers 
who represent organizations.”30 Perhaps plaintiffs’ lawyers can confer similar 
benefits on their one-shotter clients.31 Indeed, as described most thoroughly by 
                                                                                                                
Lewis M. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 47 (1998) (not testing the repeat-player hypothesis directly, but 
finding that federal courts granted dispositive, pre-trial motions in 60 percent of all 
employment discrimination cases that resulted in a definitive judgment in 1994; employers 
won 98 percent of these decisions). 
  25. For examples of studies examining appellate decisions for a repeat-player 
effect, see Songer et al., supra note 24, at 26, and Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the “Haves” 
Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870–1970, 21 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 403 (1987). 
  26. See Albiston, supra note 15, at 887–96 (reporting study of published judicial 
opinions under the Family and Medical Leave Act and noting that individual litigants’ 
successes are often not reflected in published judicial opinions); see also Maltby, supra note 
24, at 47 (finding that in 1994 employers won 98% of dispositive, pre-trial motions granted 
by federal courts in employment discrimination cases). 
  27. The presence of a repeat-player effect in arbitration is a matter of dispute. 
See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Focus on Arbitration After Gilmer: Employment Arbitration: 
The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 212–15 (1997) [hereinafter 
Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect] (finding that employees won something in 63% of all 
employment arbitrations studied, but in only 16% of arbitrations against repeat players; also 
finding that employees received, on average, a greater percentage of their demand when 
arbitrating with non-repeat player employers); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, 
Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration 
Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 238–39 (1998) [hereinafter Bingham, On Repeat 
Players] (finding that employees lose more frequently when arbitrating against a repeat-
player employer and when arbitrating before an arbitrator the employer has used before); 
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration 
Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
777, 817 (2003) (reporting results from 34 arbitrations involving repeat-player employers, 
finding that apparent repeat-player effect could be attributed to the presence of an internal 
dispute resolution program by which employers screen out and resolve meritorious claims, 
resulting in weaker claims going to arbitration); David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & 
Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical 
Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1571–72 (2005) (interpreting Hill and Bingham studies to 
suggest that “repeat-player” effect may be attributable to presence of an internal dispute 
resolution program). 
  28. Galanter, supra note 2, at 114. Indeed, it has been argued that lawyers play a 
more significant role in shaping the law than do repeat-player litigants. See Paul H. Rubin & 
Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994). 
  29. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil 
Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition 
of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1319 (2005). 
  30. Id. 
  31. Galanter recognized this possibility but doubted that lawyers could offset the 
fundamental strategic advantage enjoyed by repeat players. Galanter, supra note 2, at 118. 
Moreover, for lawyers, “[c]onsiderations of interest are likely to be fused with ideological 
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Professor Stephen Yeazell,32 plaintiffs’ firms have gradually restructured 
themselves—becoming larger, more specialized, and better financed33—in ways 
that potentially offer repeat-player benefits to their clients.34 
For my purposes, the most noteworthy aspect of this restructuring is the 
extent to which modern plaintiffs’ firms, like other repeat players, aggregate 
claims. This happens in formal and informal ways. Formal methods include 
judicial mechanisms for combining multiple claims in a single judicial proceeding, 
such as joinder, class actions, intervention, and consolidation.35 Where feasible, 
these mechanisms allow lawyers more effectively to coordinate and finance large-
scale litigation.36 Firms that undertake such litigation are of necessity specialized, 
well-financed repeat players.37 
Moreover, even where formal judicial mechanisms are unavailable, 
technological and cultural changes have increased the ability and willingness of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to pool information and risk, allowing them to match 
defendants’ litigation investments even in the largest cases.38 For example, 
                                                                                                                
commitments: the lawyers’ preference for complex and finely-tuned bodies of rules, for 
adversary proceedings, for individualized case-by-case decision-making.” Id. at 119. 
  32. Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent 
Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1991–2003 (2004) [hereinafter Yeazell, The 
Silent Litigation Revolution]; Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 
DEPAUL L. REV. 183 (2001) [hereinafter Yeazell, Re-Financing]. 
  33. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 122–23, 178–84, 202–07 (1989); 
Anita Bernstein, The Enterprise of Liability, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 27, 48–51 (2004); Yeazell, 
Re-Financing, supra note 32, at 199–200. 
  34. Legal services organizations, too, might confer repeat-player benefits on 
their clients. On the role and repeat-player status of legal services lawyers, and restrictions 
governing their practice, see generally Richard L. Abel, Law without Politics: Legal Aid 
Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV. 474 (1985); Kenneth W. Mentor & Richard 
D. Schwartz, A Tale of Two Offices: Adaptation Strategies of Selected LSC Agencies, 21 
JUST. SYS. J. 143 (2000). See also David P. McCaffrey, Corporate Resources and 
Regulatory Pressures: Toward Explaining a Discrepancy, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 398, 410–13 
(1982) (discussing role of public interest groups, including unions, in generating regulatory 
pressure through litigation). 
  35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20, 23, 24 & 42. For a general discussion of formal 
aggregation methods, and their inadequacy to the task of allowing true coordination of 
related cases, see Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical 
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 408–
17 (2000). 
  36. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 1379–81; Charles Silver & Lynn A. 
Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 
743–44 (1997). On the benefits to plaintiffs of collective representation, through the class 
action or otherwise, see Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and 
Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 543–
50, and Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 1383–89. 
  37. See Yeazell, Re-Financing, supra note 32, at 210–11. Slightly less formal 
methods of aggregation include federal multi-district litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006), 
and related state court procedures, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404 (West 2006), in which 
related cases are transferred to a single court for coordinated pretrial proceedings. 
  38. See Erichson, supra note 35, at 388–410; Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 19, 
at 1624. 
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plaintiffs’ firms may agree to coordinate their efforts in multiple lawsuits, sharing 
expertise, discovery materials, and strategy,39 and effectively treating the separate 
lawsuits as a single litigation. 
Each of these aggregation methods is “formal” to a degree, in that each 
represents an effort to coordinate litigation in response to the (more or less) 
contemporaneous filing of many related cases. Yet lawyers aggregate claims in 
entirely informal ways and in entirely unrelated disputes. As an example, consider 
a firm that specializes in representing plaintiffs in employment disputes. The law 
governing lawyers has gradually changed to make it easier for lawyers to market 
themselves40 and to share fees in exchange for client referrals.41 As a result, the 
firm likely participates in a vibrant referral network in which lawyers routinely 
refer potential clients to firms with the expertise and resources necessary to litigate 
the case effectively.42 Through marketing and referrals, the firm generates an 
inventory of unrelated cases in its area of specialty. This inventory justifies 
investment in specialized training43 and generates economies of scale,44 perhaps 
allowing the firm profitably to represent even clients with relatively low-value 
claims.45 
By informally aggregating claims in this manner, the firm may confer 
repeat-player benefits on its clients.46 For example, the firm’s expertise makes it a 
                                                                                                                
  39. See Erichson, supra note 35, at 388–89. 
  40. See ABEL, supra note 33, at 119–22; Yeazell, Re-Financing, supra note 32, 
at 200–03, 212–13; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning 
Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 749–53 (2002) [hereinafter Kritzer, Seven 
Dogged Myths] (reporting, from study of contingency fee practitioners in Wisconsin, on the 
relative significance of lawyer referrals, as opposed to direct advertising, in obtaining 
clients); Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of 
Extraordinary Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs’ Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51 
DEPAUL L. REV. 219, 226 (2001) [hereinafter Kritzer, Extraordinary Cases] (generally 
describing stratification in plaintiffs’ bar and here noting that advertising and modern 
communications have created markets for legal services “bounded largely by limitations on 
legal practice, such as admission to state bars”). 
  41. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 19, at 1622–23; Yeazell, The Silent 
Litigation Revolution, supra note 32, at 1996 & n.89; Yeazell, Re-Financing, supra note 32, 
at 201. 
  42. See Yeazell, Re-Financing, supra note 32, at 205, 212–13; Yeazell, The 
Silent Litigation Revolution, supra note 32, at 1996. While the work in this area often 
focuses on personal injury lawyers, there is reason to believe that employment lawyers can 
be characterized in similar fashion. See infra text accompanying notes 52–54. 
  43. See generally Yeazell, Re-Financing, supra note 32, at 199–201, 212–14. 
  44. See id. at 199. 
  45. See Kritzer, Extraordinary Cases, supra note 40, at 228–29 (discussing 
personal injury practices). I emphasize “relatively” low-value. It is unlikely that many 
employment law firms (as in my example) would build a practice around representing 
clients with very modest claims in court. E.g., William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of 
Employment Discrimination: What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, 50 
DISP. RESOL. J., Dec. 1995, at 40, 44. Whether firms might build such practices in arbitration 
is a separate question. 
  46. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 19, at 1613–14; see also Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 9, at 30 (noting that developments in the personal injury bar have 
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credible threat in litigation and permits it to quickly broker favorable settlements.47 
Firm lawyers may seek out and, within ethical constraints,48 select for litigation 
cases likely to establish favorable precedent.49 While the firm may not pass on to 
its clients the full benefits of its repeat-player status,50 there are reasons to believe 
that, on average, “the plaintiffs’ bar is able to offer its clients a more valuable 
product at a lower cost” than was historically possible.51 Although these 
developments have been most pronounced in the personal injury and product 
liability bars,52 the employment bar has experienced similar changes. Fueled in 
part by an expansion in the rights and remedies available to aggrieved 
employees,53 a sizeable and specialized plaintiffs’ employment bar now exists.54 
C. Aggregation of Consumer Claims 
Consumers, however, have derived limited benefit from this trend 
towards aggregation.55 To see why, consider the following example, to which I 
will return later: A number of consumers buy cars from related dealerships—all 
subsidiaries of the same parent company—paying an additional fee of less than 
$1000 for a “warranty” that promises to pay a specified benefit if the car is stolen. 
Assume that sales personnel at the various dealerships are alleged to have 
                                                                                                                
“converted the lawyers, if not the clients, into very successful repeat players”). 
  47. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 19, at 1601–02, 1614–15; Kritzer, Seven 
Dogged Myths, supra note 40, at 774–75. 
  48. For example, a lawyer could not encourage a client to drop a potentially 
valid claim simply because the case might generate a precedent unfavorable to other clients. 
See Galanter, supra note 2, at 117 & n.52. 
  49. This is not to say that lawyers will pursue rules that are optimal for their 
clients. Lawyers may prefer uncertain rules that are costly to enforce. See id. at 119; Rubin 
& Bailey, supra note 28, at 825. Yet there is likely to be substantial overlap between 
lawyers’ and clients’ interests. Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, I use the term “precedent” 
to refer to any information of systemic value in future cases. See supra note 14. In this 
sense, a settlement is precedential; information about the settlement value will inform future 
settlement decisions in similar cases. 
  50. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 30. 
  51. Yeazell, Re-Financing, supra note 32, at 215–16; see also Richard N. Block 
& Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards, 40 INDUS. 
& LAB. REL. REV. 543, 553–54 (1987) (describing attorney impact in study of grievance 
arbitration); Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 19, at 1611–16 (describing developments in 
plaintiffs’ bar and resulting efficiency benefits—that is, more rapid settlement—for clients). 
  52. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 19, at 1610–14; Menkel-Meadow, supra 
note 9, at 30; Yeazell, Re-Financing, supra note 32, at 216. 
  53. See generally Sherwyn et al., supra note 27, at 76–80. 
  54. E.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and 
Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 1019 
(1999) (reporting in 1999 that the National Employment Lawyers Association, a national 
organization of plaintiffs’ employment lawyers, had 3500 members). For information about 
the prevalence of employment and other class actions drawn from published judicial 
opinions and media reports, see DEBORAH H. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: 
PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 51–61 (2000). 
  55. For a general discussion of the barriers to consumer litigation and the need 
for aggregating devices, see Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: 
Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 34 TEX. INT’L L. J. 135, 142–50 (1999). 
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misrepresented the true cost of the “warranty,” and that this conduct, if proven, 
amounts to an unfair trade practice. The “warranty,” moreover, may be void under 
state insurance law, and the consumers may be entitled to restitution.56 
Few of these consumers are likely to obtain specialized legal 
representation as individuals. One obvious reason for this is the modest size of 
their claims.57 Even with the prospect of treble damages—authorized by some 
consumer protection laws—individual claims remain small. The cost and 
uncertainty involved in collecting any judgment compounds this problem.58 
Moreover, procedural innovations like small claims courts, and statutory 
inducements like attorney’s fees, may not induce lawyers to accept individual 
consumer cases.59 Many small claims courts do not allow legal representation at 
all,60 and those that do may not offer adequate discovery61 or a full range of 
remedies.62 Nor do small claims courts typically publish their decisions or create 
precedent;63 indeed, small claims courts are not always presided over by lawyers.64 
And although many consumer protection statutes authorize awards of attorney’s 
fees,65 lawyers may doubt that courts will award enough in fees to justify their 
                                                                                                                
  56. These facts are based on two class actions currently pending before the 
AAA. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Class Action Case Docket: Owens v. Auto. Protection 
Corp., http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25825 (last visited Jan. 27, 2007); Am. Arbitration 
Ass’n, Class Action Case Docket: Price v. Auto. Protection Corp., http://www.adr.org/ 
sp.asp?id=25827 (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). 
  57. E.g., Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes, 
1993 WIS. L. REV. 13, 85. This problem is not unique to consumer litigants. See supra note 
45 (discussing threshold for employment lawyers to accept a case). As a general matter, 
claimants with modest-size claims are poorly served by the court system. See David M. 
Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 84 (1983–84). 
  58. This is especially true for unrepresented consumers. See Richard L. Abel, 
The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 267, 298 
(Richard L. Abel ed., 1982). 
  59. An ostensible purpose of small claims courts, of course, is to permit 
individuals to obtain informal, accessible justice without retaining a lawyer at all. But the 
reality may be somewhat different. See Abel, supra note 58, at 295 (“The notion that these 
are intended to benefit individuals or tenants is a contemporary post factum legitimation; 
small claims courts were explicitly established to facilitate debt collection by merchants.”). 
  60. Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 133, 137–38; James C. Turner & Joyce A. 
McGee, Small Claims Reform: A Means of Expanding Access to the American Civil Justice 
System, 5 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 177, 187 (2000). This may enhance the advantages repeat 
players already enjoy over one-shotters. See Abel, supra note 58, at 294, 296. 
  61. See, e.g., Village of Castleton v. Pillsworth, 708 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (Just. Ct. 
2000) (denying request for discovery as inconsistent with expedited nature of small claims 
actions); Budnitz, supra note 60, at 138. 
  62. See Budnitz, supra note 60, at 138; Turner & McGee, supra note 60, at 185–
86. 
  63. Glenn E. Roper, Eternal Student Loan Liability: Who Can Sue Under 20 
U.S.C. § 1091A, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 35, 38 (2005). 
  64. E.g., N.C. Stat. § 7A-171.2.  
  65. E.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2006); Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (2006); see also Debra E. Wax, 
Annotation, Award of Attorneys’ Fees in Actions Under State Deceptive Trade Practice and 
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investment in the case.66 For these and other reasons, individual consumers may 
have limited access to a vibrant and specialized plaintiffs’ bar.67 
Of course, a lawyer might be interested in bringing a class action on 
behalf of the dispersed consumers. Indeed, that is the primary method of 
aggregating consumer claims.68 Although controversial,69 class actions have 
undeniable benefits, allowing consumers to assert low-value claims they could not 
bring as individuals70 and encouraging the development of a vibrant, well-financed 
class action bar.71 Yet class certification is far from common. Class actions run 
counter to a strong individualist streak in American law, which demands respect 
for the individual litigant’s right to control his or her own claim,72 and which, by 
                                                                                                                
Consumer Protections Acts, 35 A.L.R.4TH 12 (1985) (discussing state consumer protection 
statutes). 
  66. Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 115, 120–22, 130 (1979); Whitford, supra note 18, at 1030. 
  67. E.g., Macaulay, supra note 66, at 122, 130; Laura Nader & Christopher 
Shugart, Old Solutions for Old Problems, in NO ACCESS TO LAW 57, 58 (Laura Nader ed., 
1980). 
  68. See Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer 
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1254–56 (2001). Public interest 
lawyers, of course, may also offer specialized representation to some individual consumers. 
See supra note 34. 
  69. For just a sampling of diverse views on the merits and potential abuses of the 
class action, see Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a 
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993); Roger C. Cramton, Individualized 
Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
811 (1995); John C. Coffee Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, 
Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475; Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 
18; Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, 
Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class 
Settlements: The Godfather Guide to Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141; Martin H. 
Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private 
Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71; David Rosenberg, The Causal 
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 849 (1984). 
  70. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class 
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 30 (2000). 
  71. The vibrancy of the consumer class action bar is apparent from the 
prevalence of consumer class action litigation in state and federal courts and in its 
prominence in media reports of class actions. See Hensler et al., supra note 54, at 52–53 
(reporting that in 1995–1996 consumer cases accounted for around 25% of reported judicial 
opinions addressing class actions, and also around 25% of reports on class actions in the 
business and general press). 
  72. E.g., Roger H. Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 
CORNELL L. REV. 779, 822 (1985). Given the tendency of legal markets to aggregate claims 
informally when formal methods are unavailable, one might question whether litigants 
value the right to “control” litigation as much as is often supposed. E.g., Erichson, supra 
note 36, at 543–50; Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 1380 n.8; Silver & Baker, supra 
note 36, at 744; see also Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 19 (describing “inevitability” of 
aggregate settlement). 
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and large, requires individualized proof of facts unique to each claimant.73 Because 
of the need for such proof, class actions seeking damages may generally be 
certified only where, among other things, common questions of law or fact 
predominate over questions affecting only individual class members.74 
This balancing act leads courts to deny certification to many proposed 
consumer classes.75 Recall my example of car buyers who purchase a theft-
protection “warranty” from dealerships operating as subsidiaries of a common 
parent company.76 Assume the buyers allege that individual salespersons, acting 
pursuant to a practice common to all dealerships and encouraged by the parent, 
misled customers as to key warranty terms. This dispute raises a number of 
common questions,77 but also many questions requiring individualized proof in 
court: Did a salesperson misrepresent a material fact to each buyer? If so, did the 
buyer justifiably rely on that misrepresentation? To what extent was the buyer 
injured? Many (probably most) judges would decline to certify a class, reasoning 
that common questions do not predominate over these “individual” issues.78 
                                                                                                                
  73. Cf. Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante v. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1803, 1838 (1997) (class actions call for “less inquiry into the individual circumstances of 
each case”). 
  74. I am referring here to class actions under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
  75. See Andrews v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 1014, 1025 (11th Cir. 1996) (reversing class 
certification in class action filed by customers of long-distance telephone companies; 
plaintiffs had to prove reliance on alleged misrepresentation, as well as fact and amount of 
injury, on an individual basis); Parkhill v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 188 F.R.D. 332, 343 
(D. Minn. 1999) (declining certification in “vanishing premium” life insurance case due to 
need for individualized inquiry into whether a misrepresentation was made to, and relied 
upon by, each plaintiff); Martin v. Dahlberg, Inc., 156 F.R.D. 207, 216–17 (N.D. Cal. 1994) 
(denying certification because individual issues of reliance on alleged misrepresentations 
predominated in suit by purchasers of hearing aids against manufacturer and other 
defendants); Gross v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 696 A.2d 793, 
798 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997) (denying certification in consumer fraud suit against maker of 
heartburn medication because of predominance of individual issues concerning whether 
each consumer saw and relied on alleged misrepresentation). Consumers have had the most 
success obtaining class certification where the relevant substantive law dispenses with the 
need to prove individual reliance and damages, as with the statutory damages provisions of 
the Truth in Lending Act, U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (2006). See generally Christopher L. 
Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of 
the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 886–90 (2003) (discussing the expansion and 
eventual contraction of TILA litigation); Whitford, supra note 18, at 1030–31 (noting 
potential success of TILA in inducing consumer claiming). 
  76. Supra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
  77. Examples of issues common to the class as a whole, or to appropriate 
subclasses, might include whether the parent company can be held liable for 
misrepresentations made by employees of its subsidiaries, and whether state insurance law 
authorizes a cause of action for rescission. Cf. Order No. 2 (Respondent’s Motion to 
Dismiss) at 12, Owens v. Auto. Protection Corp., No. 30 459 00642 05, 13–17 (May 10, 
2006) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=2239 (discussing 
these issues in the class arbitration from which my example is drawn). 
  78. See supra note 75; see also In re Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. Premium Litig., 
183 F.R.D. 217, 221 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy 
predominance requirement, despite alleging that defendant prepared uniform, misleading 
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For the consumer advocate, at least, this is an unsatisfactory result, one 
that “arises from slavish adherence to the fiction that individual members are 
before the court and hence that the amount of money to be paid by the defendant 
should be the sum of the individual claims.”79 Denial of certification, of course, 
typically means that few if any consumers will assert claims at all,80 and the 
deterrence objectives of consumer protection laws will go unfulfilled.81 
D. The Individuation Critique 
1. Does Arbitration Individuate Claiming? 
As should be clear from the foregoing discussion, aggregation benefits 
consumers and employees primarily as claimants.82 Despite difficulties in 
obtaining certification, many consumer83 and employment84 classes have been 
certified, and employees, at least those with sizeable claims,85 may also find 
specialized, effective representation in individual lawsuits.86 These are significant 
developments, and they reflect the increased ability of the plaintiffs’ bar to 
influence the outcome of particular cases and the legal system at large. 
The individuation critique sees arbitration as one of a number of tools 
repeat-player defendants use to combat the increased influence of the plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                                
sales materials for independent insurance brokers, because of need to determine what 
materials were presented, and what representations made, by brokers to each plaintiff). 
  79. Nader & Shugart, supra note 67, at 93. 
  80. See Issacharoff, supra note 55, at 147 (noting need for device to aggregate 
consumer claims); cf. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(“[A] class action has to be unwieldy indeed before it can be pronounced an inferior 
alternative . . . to no litigation at all.”). 
  81. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 168–75 (2006) (noting that arbitration and class action prohibitions 
may leave credit card industry free to engage in misconduct without challenge); Issacharoff, 
supra note 55, at 147 (“This problem [of finding a way to aggregate consumer claims] is all 
the more compelling if the purpose of consumer enforcement is seen to be as much 
deterrence of misconduct as actual compensation to victims of fraud.”). 
  82. As defendants (“respondents,” in arbitration), consumers may be even less 
likely to find a lawyer and, except in rare cases, cannot combine their defense efforts with 
other claimants. But see Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2004) (credit card holder sued in collections action files class action counterclaim). 
  83. E.g., Carnegie, 376 F.3d at 661; Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-5994, 
2001 WL 366432 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2001); Lopez v. Orlor, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 35 (D. Conn. 
1997); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 137 F.R.D. 677 (N.D. Ga. 1991); Dix v. 
Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co., 415 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 1987); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 807 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). 
  84. E.g., Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 2004); 
Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2001); Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004); McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott 
Servs., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 428 (D.D.C. 2002); Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 164 F.R.D. 
667 (C.D. Ill. 1996); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657, 665–67 (D. Minn. 
1991). 
  85. See supra note 45. 
  86. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54. 
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bar.87 In general terms, the critique posits that businesses will structure the 
arbitration process in ways that force consumers and employees into individuated 
proceedings,88 and that ADR providers, in their desire to attract arbitration 
business,89 will adopt rules that have a similar effect. 
The most obvious way this might happen is by preventing class actions. 
Especially in the consumer context, arbitration skeptics often assume that 
businesses use arbitration specifically to prevent class actions,90 an assumption 
                                                                                                                
  87. See Alderman, supra note 68, at 1255 (“[A]s consumers have marshaled the 
resources and expertise to compete with the repeat player in the courts, the repeat player has 
taken steps to change the forum through the imposition of mandatory arbitration.”). A 
similar argument might be made about efforts to restrict lawyers’ ability to advertise or 
solicit clients. Cf. Yeazell, The Silent Litigation Revolution, supra note 32, at 1985–88 
(describing how states resisted desegregation efforts by seeking to restrict lawyers’ ability 
to solicit clients and control the strategic direction of litigation). Other possibilities include 
limits on the fees recoverable by plaintiffs’ lawyers and reduced or contingent funding for 
legal aid, see THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE 
OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 27–37 (2002), and many other aspects of the “tort 
reform” movement, including public relations efforts to shape public opinion about the legal 
system, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had Is Between 
People’s Ears”: Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 
453, 461–72 (2000); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: 
The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
1, 50–52, 65–71, 74–80 (2002). See also John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years 
of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021 (2005) 
(characterizing current tort reform movement as a reaction to the expansion of tort rights). 
  88. Arbitration skeptics not surprisingly focus on the temptation for repeat-
player contract drafters to structure the arbitration process to their advantage. E.g., Jean R. 
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1649–52 
(2005); Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory 
Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 221, 232–39; 
Richard A. Bales, The Laissez-Faire Arbitration Market and the Need for a Uniform 
Federal Standard Governing Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 
583, 606–08 (2004); Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the “National Policy” of the 
Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259, 285 (2002–2003). That temptation may be enhanced by the 
Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 
1–16 (2006), which has restricted states’ efforts to regulate the terms of arbitration 
agreements. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) 
(invalidating state-law “conspicuous notice” requirement for arbitration agreements); 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995) (extending the FAA 
to the limits of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause); Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) (noting that unless the parties agreed 
otherwise, the FAA would preempt a state law rule forbidding arbitral awards of punitive 
damages); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (describing states’ limited 
authority to regulate arbitration agreements); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 
(1984) (holding that the FAA established a “national policy favoring arbitration” applicable 
in state as well as federal courts). 
  89. Cf. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1063–64 
(2000) (noting incentives for arbitrators to rule in ways that do not offend repeat-player 
businesses). 
  90. E.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and 
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buttressed by various comments made by consumer finance industry insiders, 
advocates, and ADR professionals.91 Indeed, because the class action features so 
prominently in any discussion of consumer litigation—and thus in any discussion 
of consumer arbitration—debates over consumer arbitration focus primarily on the 
use of arbitration to eliminate consumer class actions.92 
But the lack of class actions is only the most obvious example of how 
arbitration might individuate disputes. Others include arbitrators’ failure to 
develop or follow precedent,93 issue written, reasoned awards, or award punitive 
damages, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief.94 Such individuated arbitration 
proceedings might not permit the economies of scale needed to justify substantial 
litigation investments, specialized training, or efforts to develop a case inventory.95 
Contingency-fee lawyers might decline cases destined for arbitration,96 and those 
                                                                                                                
Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 267, 310, 318, 326–330 (1995); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The 
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396–
99 (2005); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate 
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 75, 75; Sternlight, supra note 70, at 5–12. While 
contract drafters initially may have assumed that merely including an arbitration agreement 
in the transaction would prevent class action litigation, that assumption is no longer tenable 
after Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). Thus, we might expect 
contracts increasingly to contain express waivers of the right to bring or participate in class 
proceedings. See Bingham, supra note 88, at 236–37; Gilles, supra, at 410. 
  91. E.g., Dwight Golann, Consumer Financial Services Litigation: Major 
Judgments and ADR Responses, 48 BUS. LAW. 1141 (1993) (describing class action 
litigation in California between consumers and financial institutions and the subsequent 
implementation of arbitration programs); Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Drafting and 
Implementing of a Consumer Loan Arbitration Clause, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 295, 
295 (1997) (opining that consumer financial services companies are pressured to settle 
lawsuits for reasons having nothing to do with their merits and advocating arbitration as a 
means to prevent such lawsuits, particularly class actions); Lloyd N. Shields, The Role of 
Mandatory Arbitration for Financial Institutions, 46 ARB. J. 49, 52 (1991) (article by 
director of AAA stating that “[a]rbitration may be the financial community’s answer to the 
class-action contingent-fee strike suit”); Letter from Curtis V. Brown, V.P. and General 
Counsel, National Arbitration Forum, to prospective client (Jan. 14, 1999) (on file with 
author) (noting that an arbitration clause may eliminate class actions); see also Complaint, 
Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 05-CV-07116 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 11, 2005) (on file with 
author) (alleging major credit card issuers conspired, in violation of antitrust laws, to 
impose arbitration agreements, in part to avoid class actions). 
  92. See supra notes 90–91. 
  93. See Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the 
Common Law, 2 J. AM. ARB. 1, 11 (2003) (“Unlike court opinions, which are published, 
most decisions of arbitrators are kept secret, often not even accompanied by a written 
opinion. Even when published and made available to the public, the decision of one 
arbitrator, or a panel of arbitrators, is in no way binding on any other arbitrator or panel.”). 
Cf. Abel, supra note 58, at 288–91, 290 (“Conflict can result in prospective aggregation 
through the declaration or modification of general behavioral norms.”). 
  94. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 37. 
  95. See supra text accompanying notes 40–45. 
  96. Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 27, at 198–200. 
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who accepted such cases might be relatively unspecialized, poorly capitalized, and 
otherwise less effective than their repeat-player peers in the plaintiffs’ bar.97 
Indeed, the individuation critique might retain its force even if we thought 
consumers and employees generally fared well in individual arbitrations.98 Without 
formal aggregation techniques like the class action, and without repeat-player 
lawyers, overall claiming rates might remain low,99 and certain claims—those 
requiring substantial investments and sophisticated lawyers—might not be brought 
at all.100 
                                                                                                                
  97. Id. 
  98. At least in the employment context, a growing body of empirical evidence 
suggests that employees may fare relatively well in arbitration. See, e.g., Bingham, The 
Repeat Player Effect, supra note 27, at 213 (finding 63% employee win-rate in 1993–1994, 
but only 16% win-rate against “repeat players”); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, 
Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. 
RESOL. J., Jan. 2004, at 44, 48–49 (finding that higher-pay employees fare as well or better 
in arbitration and that lower-pay employees may fare somewhat worse, but noting that 
apparent superiority of court over arbitration for lower-pay employees may reflect greater 
likelihood that court plaintiffs are subject only to “for cause” termination); Hill, supra note 
27, at 817 (presenting data suggesting that “repeat player” effect noted by Bingham may be 
attributable to the presence of an internal dispute resolution program, which allows 
employers to screen out and settle meritorious cases before arbitration); Howard, supra note 
45 (finding employee win-rate of 28% in court, versus 68% in AAA arbitration and 48% in 
securities industry arbitration; results do not take into account pre-trial dispositions and may 
therefore overstate win-rate in court); Maltby, supra note 24, at 47–48 (finding, among 
other things, that employee claimants receive on average 18% of their demand in 
arbitration, versus 10.4% in litigation; also noting that 60% of employment cases in federal 
court are terminated on pretrial motion, with employers winning 98% of those decisions); 
see also Sherwyn et al., supra note 27, at 1578 (summarizing existing research). But see 
Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women Prevail in Employment 
Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 573 (2005) (finding, based on study of 
employment arbitration awards subjected to judicial review, that employees succeed more 
often in arbitration than at trial, but recover less, and that women more often received “split 
awards,” such as awards denying attorney’s fees). A variety of methodological issues make 
it difficult to draw firm conclusions from this research. E.g., Sherwyn et al., supra note 27, 
at 1564–66. 
One study of consumer arbitration, conducted by Ernst & Young and funded by the 
American Bankers Association, suggests that consumers generally fare  
well as arbitration claimants, although the study makes some debatable assumptions, 
including that consumers prevailed each time a case was dismissed at the claimant’s 
request. ERNST & YOUNG, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSUMER 
LENDING CASES (2004) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG STUDY],  
available at http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/US/Outcomes_of_Arbitration/$file/ 
OutcomesofArbitrationAnEmpiricalStudy.pdf. For criticism of this study, see Ctr. for 
Responsible Lending, Comments on Ernst & Young Arbitration Outcomes Report  
(Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ib025-Ernst_Young_Arbitration_ 
Comments-0205.pdf. 
  99. See Whitford, supra note 18, at 1030 (noting role of attorneys in informing 
consumers of rights). 
100. Cf. id. at 1030 (noting importance of lawyers in “inform[ing] consumers of 
their rights in an effort to stimulate legal business”). 
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While theoretically defensible, these objections to arbitration at present 
have only modest empirical support.101 The best available evidence suggests that 
only a minority of consumer arbitration agreements—albeit a substantial 
minority—expressly prohibit class actions,102 although these terms may become 
more common after Bazzle.103 Employment arbitration agreements may be less 
likely than consumer agreements to prohibit classwide proceedings.104 As for other 
individuating contract terms, such as those restricting arbitration remedies, 
requiring confidentiality, or preventing arbitrators from issuing written awards, the 
                                                                                                                
101. One can find evidence that some businesses include one-sided terms in 
arbitration agreements in published judicial opinions ruling on a consumer’s or employee’s 
challenge to the agreement’s enforceability. See, e.g., Bales, supra note 88, at 606–08; 
Carrington, supra note 88, at 286; David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping 
Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 
49, 56–59 (2003). But focusing on such cases may yield a skewed picture of arbitration 
agreements generally, as lawyers should be less willing to challenge a scrupulously even-
handed arbitration agreement. To my knowledge, Professors Linda Demaine and Deborah 
Hensler have conducted the most systematic study of consumer arbitration agreements. 
Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute 
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Winter/Spring 2004, at 55. 
102. See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 101, at 60, 65 (finding that 30.8% of a 
sample of consumer arbitration agreements collected in 2001 included contract terms 
precluding class actions). In conducting research for this paper, I also collected as many of 
the arbitration agreements at issue in the AAA class arbitrations as I could find. (These 
agreements are often available on the AAA website; in other cases I downloaded them from 
PACER.) In total, I collected 32 agreements (16 consumer and 16 employment). Of these, 5 
of the 16 (31%) of the consumer agreements forbid class actions, but none of the 16 
employment agreements contains a similar term. I do not suggest that these results are 
representative of the broader universe of arbitration agreements. Class action prohibitions in 
particular may be underrepresented in the sample, as the AAA requires a court order before 
it will accept for class arbitration a dispute under an agreement that expressly bars class 
actions. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, American Arbitration Association Policy on Class 
Arbitrations (July 14, 2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25967. 
103. Gilles, supra note 90, at 410; Sternlight, supra note 70, at 90–91. 
104. For example, in a 1995 survey of employment arbitration agreements, the 
General Accounting Office found that only one of the twenty-six clauses studied limited the 
remedies available in arbitration. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-150, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1995) [hereinafter 1995 GAO REPORT]. The 1995 GAO Report did 
not mention whether any of the agreements forbade class actions, and silence on that point 
likely indicates that the agreements did not refer to class actions at all. See Mei L. Bickner 
et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration: Analysis of a New Survey of Employment 
Arbitration Programs, 52 DISP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 8, 81 (reporting that two-thirds of 
surveyed employment arbitration plans did not restrict available remedies, although a 
minority limited damages in some way, and that around one-half of plans specifically 
permitted punitive damages; no reference to class action prohibitions). Again, in my sample 
of arbitration agreements drawn from the AAA class arbitrations, none of the employment 
agreements expressly barred class actions. See supra note 102 (also noting that such terms 
may be underrepresented in these agreements). For an analysis of arbitration clauses in a 
sample of franchise agreements, see Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration 
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695. 
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best available evidence suggests that these terms may be less common than the 
individuation critique would predict.105 
While further study may reveal the critique to be an apt description of 
arbitration contracts in certain industries—the consumer finance industry is an 
example106—the existing evidence suggests that the critique may be somewhat 
overbroad. There are other reasons why businesses might prefer arbitration to 
litigation, and it is not obvious that most agreements will contain individuating 
terms.107 Furthermore, as I discuss below, even when an agreement does contain 
such terms, their impact may be limited. To understand why, we need to examine 
the institutional context in which many arbitrations occur. 
2. The Potential Moderating Effect of ADR Provider Rules 
The individuation critique is founded on an explicitly contractualist 
model of arbitration. The model assigns to the contracting parties themselves 
primary authority for setting the terms of arbitration and gives correspondingly 
little weight to the role of extra-contractual forces in shaping arbitration procedure. 
Of course, consumer and employment contracts tend not to be models of arms-
                                                                                                                
105. See, e.g., 1995 GAO REPORT, supra note 104 (finding in a 1995 survey of 
employment arbitration agreements that only one of the twenty-six clauses studied limited 
the remedies available in arbitration); Bickner et al., supra note 104, at 81 (reporting that 
two-thirds of surveyed employment arbitration plans did not restrict available remedies, 
although a minority limited damages in some way); Demaine & Hensler, supra note 101, at 
69, 71–72 (finding that 13.5% of a sample of consumer agreements collected in 2001 
required that some aspect of the arbitration be kept confidential and that 7.7% of the 
agreements restricted the remedies available in arbitration). 
106. See supra note 91. 
107. Arbitration, for example, likely reduces the cost of resolving disputes, see 
Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 
Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 90–91, and businesses and employers may pass some 
of these savings on in the form of higher wages or lower prices, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 
104, at 741; Ware, supra, at 90–94. Arbitration may also produce faster results; all else 
being equal, this is a clear benefit to claimants. Most of the empirical evidence concerning 
arbitration procedures and results has focused on employment arbitration. In that context, 
there seems little question that arbitration produces faster results, e.g., Maltby, supra note 
24, at 55; Sherwyn et al., supra note 27, at 1572–73, 1578, 1588–89, and the same is likely 
true for consumer arbitration. 
Employers in particular may have varied reasons for adopting arbitration programs. 
Many have long relied on a variety of informal dispute resolution procedures that may 
reduce the costs associated with disputing: legal expenses, lost management time, increased 
employee turnover, and reduced employee morale. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 27, at 
1579; see also 1995 GAO REPORT, supra note 104 (finding, in survey of businesses that 
filed 1992 EEOC reports and had at least 100 employees, that almost 90% used some 
variety of ADR, though only 9.9% used arbitration (often not mandatory)). For a different 
perspective on employment arbitration, one focusing on the consequences of permitting 
private organizations to internalize the disputing process, see Lauren B. Edelman & Mark 
C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL 
COME OUT AHEAD?, supra note 10, at 290. And for a discussion of the risk-management 
function of arbitration, see Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 
83 OR. L. REV. 861 (2004). 
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length negotiation. To those skeptical that market forces will produce an 
acceptable allocation of risk, such contracts are an invitation to overreach for the 
party with the stronger bargaining position. Put bluntly, the individuation critique 
posits that arbitration will individuate disputes because that is what businesses and 
employers want, and they will structure their arbitration agreements accordingly. 
This explicitly contractualist view of arbitration, however, may 
oversimplify a far more complex empirical reality—one in which other forces also 
shape the arbitration process. Here, I will focus on the role played by ADR 
providers. As I discuss in more detail below, the institutional values and incentives 
under which providers operate differ in significant ways from those of the 
businesses who are presumed to dictate the terms of arbitration.108 For now, the 
important point is that providers may have a significant impact on arbitration 
procedure.109 
For example, the AAA and other providers have adopted “due process” 
protocols applicable to consumer and employment cases. These protocols set 
minimum standards of procedural fairness for arbitrations and have been endorsed 
by a variety of organizations with an interest in consumer and employment 
relationships.110 For illustrative purposes, I will focus primarily on the AAA’s 
Consumer111 and Employment112 protocols, along with its arbitration rules,113 in 
the following discussion. Readers should bear in mind that if an arbitration 
agreement does not substantially and materially comply with the governing 
protocol, the AAA may decline to administer the arbitration unless the business 
                                                                                                                
108. See infra text accompanying notes 225–248. 
109. In a sense, ADR provider rules are not extrinsic to the arbitration agreement. 
Drafting parties are often aware of these rules, which offer off-the-rack disputing 
procedures that can be incorporated into the agreement. Yet when provider rules conflict 
with an express term in the agreement, the provider is typically involved in resolving the 
conflict, often by insisting that the business waive (or the consumer waive objection to) the 
offending term. In a sense, the provider’s involvement consists of facilitating a second 
negotiation between the business and the consumer over disputing remedies and procedures. 
In this negotiation, however, the consumer may be represented by a lawyer. 
110. The employment protocol, for example, was developed by a task force 
comprised of individuals designated by a number of organizations representing employers, 
employees, and arbitration providers. Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process 
Protocol at Ten: Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 165, 165 (2005). The protocol emphasizes that its principles reflect 
the views of the designees and not necessarily those of the designating organizations. E.g., 
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF 
STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995) [hereinafter 
EMPLOYMENT PROTOCOL], available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535. 
111. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1998) 
[hereinafter CONSUMER PROTOCOL], available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019. 
112. See EMPLOYMENT PROTOCOL, supra note 110. 
113. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR CONSUMER-
RELATED DISPUTES (2005) [hereinafter CONSUMER RULES], available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE 
RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (INCLUDING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES) 
(2005) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT RULES], available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22075. 
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waives the offending term or revises its agreement to eliminate the term.114 Other 
ADR providers have adopted similar rules,115 though not all are equally favorable 
from the perspective of consumer advocates.116 
These rules already limit the ability of businesses to impose certain one-
sided arbitration terms. For example, provider rules typically limit the up-front 
costs of arbitration117 and may also protect consumers and employees from 
contract terms requiring them to travel great distances to attend an arbitration 
hearing.118 Other rules address more directly some of the potentially individuating 
aspects of the arbitration process. 
                                                                                                                
114. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Statement of Ethical Principles for the American 
Arbitration Association, an ADR Provider Organization, http://www.adr.org/ 
sp.asp?id=22036 (last visited Jan. 20, 2007); AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, FAIR PLAY: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON CONSUMER AND 
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 33–34 (2003) [hereinafter FAIR PLAY], available at 
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1843. If the business refuses to waive the defect or amend its 
agreement, the claimant may or may not be entitled to litigate in court. The business might 
succeed in compelling arbitration before another provider or before another arbitrator. 
Presumably, however, evidence that the provider views the agreement as inconsistent with 
minimum standards of fairness would increase the likelihood that a court would invalidate 
the agreement altogether. 
115. See JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-
DISPUTE CLAUSES:  MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2005) [hereinafter 
JAMS CONSUMER POLICY], available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/consumer_ 
min_std.asp; JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: MINIMUM STANDARDS 
OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2005) [hereinafter JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY], available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/employment_Arbitration_min_stds.asp. 
116. Consumer advocates generally view the National Arbitration 
Forum’s rules as the least favorable. For those rules, see NAT’L ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE 
OF PROCEDURE (2006) [hereinafter NAF CODE OF PROCEDURE], available at http://www.arb-
forum.com (follow “Rules & Forms” hyperlink), and NAT’L ARBITRATION FORUM, 
CONSUMER AND EMPLOYEE ARBITRATION RIGHTS (2006), available at http://www.arb-
forum.com (follow “Rules & Forms” hyperlink). 
117. For claims that do not exceed $75,000, AAA rules limit consumers’ and 
employees’ up-front costs to $125 or $375, depending on the size of the claim. See 
CONSUMER RULES, supra note 113, R. C-8. The Employment Rules cap costs for most 
employees at $125, although the employee may agree to pay part of the arbitrator’s fee. See 
EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 113, administrative fee schedule. Other ADR providers 
have adopted similar rules. See JAMS CONSUMER POLICY, supra note 115; JAMS 
EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 115. But see NAT’L ARBITRATION FORUM, FEE SCHEDULE: 
FEES FOR COMMON CLAIMS 3 (2006), available at http://www.adrforum.com/ 
users/naf/resources/20060501FeeSchedule2.pdf. As a general matter, the National 
Arbitration Forum’s fee schedule is the least favorable, and also appears to allow the 
business to impose a greater fee in the contract. Id. For a discussion and critique of provider 
rules generally, see Budnitz, supra note 60, at 136–43. 
118. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, LOCALE DETERMINATIONS (2006), available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28629; see also JAMS CONSUMER POLICY, supra note 115. 
The AAA, for example, may require the business to “waive the [contractually required] 
locale if the locale is not reasonably convenient” for consumers. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
LOCALE DETERMINATIONS, supra; see also JAMS CONSUMER POLICY, supra note 115, 
para. 5 (addressing location of consumer arbitration); cf. NAF CODE OF PROCEDURE, supra 
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a. Reasoned Versus Summary Awards 
The lack of a written, reasoned award is potentially one of the more 
individuating features of arbitration.119 When present, such awards may influence 
future arbitrators in similar cases and provide important information to third 
parties. For instance, in my example of car buyers who purchase an additional theft 
protection warranty, such an award might facilitate judicial review, alert state 
regulators to questionable practices, and inform other consumers about dealer 
practices. 
To the extent businesses would prefer that arbitrators avoid written, 
reasoned awards, provider rules generally do not oblige. Of the three major 
arbitration providers, two generally require brief written, reasoned awards in both 
employment and consumer arbitration, and the third entitles parties to receive such 
an award upon request and payment of a fee.120 In employment cases, the AAA 
also makes its awards public, although it redacts the identities of the parties and 
witnesses.121 To be sure, businesses might forbid reasoned, written awards in the 
arbitration agreement itself; it is unclear whether providers like the AAA would 
view such contract terms as consistent with the due process protocols.122 It is an 
open question whether such terms appear with any frequency in consumer and 
employment arbitration agreements. The scant empirical evidence suggests that 
they may be relatively rare.123 
                                                                                                                
note 116, R. 32 (stating that an in-person, participatory hearing is to occur in the federal 
judicial district where the respondent resides or does business; respondent “does business 
where it has minimum contacts with a Consumer [or employee]”). I know of no similar 
AAA policy expressly protecting employees, but other providers may have more protective 
policies. See JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 115, Standard No. 6 (location of 
hearing must not preclude access to arbitration). 
119. A reasoned award is one that explains, even if briefly, the arbitrator’s 
findings and reasoning. 
120. See EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 113, R. 34; see also CONSUMER RULES, 
supra note 113, R. C-7 (only requiring that the award be in writing); CONSUMER PROTOCOL, 
supra note 111, Principle 15 (requiring arbitrator, upon timely request of either party, to 
provide brief written explanation of basis for award); JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra 
note 115, Standard No. 8 (providing for “concise written statement” of reasons for award); 
JAMS CONSUMER POLICY, supra note 115, para. 10 (same). But see NAF CODE OF 
PROCEDURE, supra note 116, R. 37(H) (stating that awards are to be “summary awards” 
unless the parties agree otherwise, or unless a party requests findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and pays a fee). 
121. EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 113, R. 34. 
122. Consumer Protocol Principle 15 provides that “[a]t the timely request of 
either party, the arbitrator should provide a brief written explanation of the basis for the 
award.” CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 111, Principle 15. Likewise, the Employment 
Protocol provides that “[t]he arbitrator should issue an opinion and award setting forth a 
summary of the issues, including the type(s) of dispute(s), the damages and/or other relief 
requested and awarded, a statement of any other issues resolved, and a statement regarding 
the disposition of any statutory claim(s).” EMPLOYMENT PROTOCOL, supra note 110, pt. C.5. 
123. One study of consumer arbitration agreements found that only 4 of 52 
clauses stated that the arbitrator would not provide a written explanation of their award. See 
Demaine & Hensler, supra note 101, at 68–69. Likewise, in my review of the consumer and 
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b. Remedies Available in Arbitration 
Businesses might also include in their agreements terms restricting the 
remedies available in arbitration. Once again, however, provider rules may limit 
the impact of these terms. For example, the AAA Consumer and Employment 
protocols provide that arbitrators should be able to award “whatever relief would 
be available in court.”124 This does not necessarily imply that all contractual 
limitations on remedies are invalid. One interpretation is that an arbitrator should 
honor a limitation if a court, applying applicable law, would enforce it in a judicial 
proceeding.125 Yet on one occasion, the AAA asserted that an agreement violated 
the Consumer Protocol by allowing only recovery of direct damages in most cases 
and barring recovery of punitive and other damages in all cases, without 
suggesting that its decision depended on whether a court would enforce a similar 
limitation.126 This suggests that in some cases AAA policies might offer 
consumers and employees more protection from one-sided terms than would be 
available in court. 
c. Limits on the Right to Bring or Participate in a Class Action 
There is little evidence concerning how frequently consumer and 
employment arbitration agreements expressly prohibit classwide proceedings.127 
Nevertheless, provider rules generally do not disapprove of such terms. The AAA, 
for example, requires a court order before it will administer a class arbitration if 
the agreement purports to bar class actions, consolidation, or joinder.128 This 
                                                                                                                
employment agreements at issue in the AAA class arbitrations, none of the twenty-six 
agreements forbade reasoned, written awards; two of the sixteen consumer and nine of the 
sixteen employment agreements explicitly called for such awards. 
124. See CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 111, Principle 14; EMPLOYMENT 
PROTOCOL, supra note 110, pt. C.5; see also JAMS CONSUMER POLICY, supra note 115, 
para. 3 (stating that remedies that would be available in court must remain available in 
consumer arbitration); JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 115, Standard No. 1 (same, 
for employment arbitration). As I indicated earlier, supra note 114, AAA policy is to 
decline to administer an arbitration if the agreement does not substantially and materially 
comply with the relevant protocol, unless the business waives the term or amends the 
agreement. 
125. Cf. NAF CODE OF PROCEDURE, supra note 116, R. 20D (stating that remedies 
may not be “unlawfully restricted”—suggesting lawful restrictions should be enforced). 
126. See Affidavit of Neil B. Currie on Behalf of the American Arbitration 
Association in Response and Objection to a Subpoena for Documents Issued By Plaintiff, 
Ragan v. AT&T Corp., No. 02-L-168 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 15, 2002) (on file with author). 
127. See supra note 102. 
128. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, American Arbitration Association Policy on 
Class Arbitrations (July 14, 2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25967. For a rather 
tendentious summary of the evolution of the JAMS class action policy, see Kelly Thompson 
Cochran & Eric J. Mogilnicki, Current Issues in Consumer Arbitration, 60 BUS. LAW. 785, 
793–94 (2005). The National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) rules do not expressly address 
class arbitration, but the NAF has marketed its services in the past as one way for businesses 
to avoid class litigation altogether. See Letter from Curtis V. Brown, Vice President and 
General Counsel, National Arbitration Forum, to prospective client (Jan. 14, 1999) (on file 
with author) (noting that an arbitration clause may eliminate class actions). 
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policy is rather tolerant of class action prohibitions; the implication is that AAA 
arbitrators may not even consider challenges to the enforceability of such terms.129 
Instead, parties wishing to challenge them must do so in court.130 
3. Summary 
As we have seen, although arbitration providers are relatively indulgent 
of contract terms prohibiting class actions, their rules may limit the ability of 
businesses to impose certain one-sided terms, including some terms that 
individuate the disputing process. Nevertheless, if aggregation by formal or 
informal methods is essential to create a level playing field in arbitration, ADR 
providers do not yet do enough to facilitate this process. For individual consumers, 
for example, arbitral “due process” primarily means a neutral decision-maker, 
limited discovery, and a simplified hearing process.131 These procedures may be 
incompatible with cases requiring significant discovery or raising complex issues. 
Moreover, provider rules do not establish conditions under which an arbitrator’s 
decision may be given precedential effect. This silence is consistent with the view 
that arbitration is neither “rule-based” nor “rule-communicating.”132 That is, 
arbitrators need not apply consistent rules in similar cases,133 nor do they 
                                                                                                                
129. E.g., Letter from Thomas G. Foley Jr. to Karen Fontaine, AAA, 1–2 (Dec. 
21, 2004). The letter recounts that, although the arbitration agreement barred class actions, 
the parties had agreed to let the arbitrator decide whether to allow class arbitration anyway, 
but that despite this agreement the AAA had declined to accept the case unless the claimants 
dropped their request for class arbitration or obtained a court order. 
130. Contrast this policy to typical arbitration rules, which permit the arbitrator to 
decide questions of arbitrability, including questions concerning the existence, scope, or 
validity of the arbitration clause. E.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 7(a) (2005) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL RULES], 
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440. Just how decision-making authority 
should be allocated between courts and arbitrators is a matter of some dispute among 
arbitration scholars. Compare Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, 
and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration 
Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 823–27 (2003) (generally suggesting a more active role 
for courts in considering challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements), with 
Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability” in Seventeen 
Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1 (2003) (generally suggesting a more limited 
role in which courts decide only questions that legitimately call into question a party’s 
assent to arbitration). Courts, too, have reached conflicting results. Compare Hawkins v. 
Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2003) (referring to arbitration dispute 
over enforceability of terms limiting remedies and class actions in arbitration), with Ting v. 
AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148–52 (9th Cir. 2003) (considering whether class action ban and 
other terms rendered arbitration agreement unconscionable). The AAA policy is noteworthy 
because, whichever decisionmaker should address these challenges, it is unusual indeed for 
an ADR provider voluntarily to limit its own decision-making authority. 
131. This often means a “desk arbitration,” a telephonic hearing, or a streamlined 
in-person hearing that might last no more than a day. See CONSUMER RULES, supra note 
113, R. C-5 & C-6; COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 130, R. E-8. 
132. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of 
Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 893, 988–89. 
133. As a general rule, arbitrators need not follow the decisions of other 
arbitrators, nor apply rules of substantive law: “The weight of authority permits an arbitrator 
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necessarily communicate rules to third parties in ways that influence future 
behavior.134 
What may be most surprising, however, is the extent to which many 
provider rules even now do facilitate aggregation. Even outside the class 
arbitration context, for example, providers may require reasoned, written awards 
and may refuse to administer arbitrations where the agreement limits the remedies 
available to consumers or employees.135 Moreover, providers may sometimes 
object to one-sided terms, such as terms requiring litigation in a remote forum, 
even when courts might reach the opposite conclusion.136 These rules are hard to 
square with the individuation critique, which presumes that businesses wish to 
impose an individuated disputing process and that providers will abet them in that 
goal. 
As a description of current arbitration practices, then, the individuation 
critique is of uncertain validity. Assessing its merit requires answers to a number 
                                                                                                                
to ‘do justice as he sees it’ and fashion an award that embodies the individual justice 
required by a given set of facts.” Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 
N.C. L. REV. 81, 85 (1992). The FAA implicitly acknowledges this flexibility by sharply 
limiting the grounds on which a court may vacate an arbitral award; vacatur is not available 
for errors of law. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). And while some courts leave room to vacate 
awards issued in “manifest disregard of the law,” or that violate public policy, few awards 
are vacated on these grounds. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: 
Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 724–25 (1999); see also 
George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580–81 (7th Cir. 2001) (equating 
arbitrator to parties’ agent, who may order any relief parties could agree to themselves; 
vacatur on “manifest disregard” or public policy grounds appropriate only where award 
directs a violation of law). Thus, “an agreement to arbitrate is, in effect, an agreement to 
comply with the arbitrator’s decision whether or not the arbitrator applies the law.” Ware, 
supra, at 711.  
In consumer and employment arbitration, this “lawless” aspect of arbitration may raise 
concerns, especially over arbitrators’ ability and willingness to apply “mandatory” public 
law. E.g., Ware, supra, at 727–28 (noting inconsistency of treating legal rules as mandatory 
in all contexts except arbitration). As an empirical matter, of course, arbitrators may or may 
not follow substantive law in consumer and employment disputes; there is little evidence on 
the question. E.g., Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law, 45 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 683, 694 (1992) (evaluating a sample of labor arbitration awards 
and concluding that “few arbitrators consider statutory rights fully and in detail”). If 
concerns over “lawlessness” are empirically valid, they may be addressed, at least in part, 
by provider rules requiring arbitrators to follow the law. E.g., CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra 
note 111, Principle 15(2). Where providers insist on such rules, refusal to apply mandatory 
substantive law arguably would exceed the arbitrator’s power and provide grounds for 
vacatur. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006). 
134. See Baruch Bush, supra note 132, at 989; see also Landes & Posner, supra 
note 15, at 238–40 (noting reasons why private dispute resolution systems are unlikely to 
produce rules or precedent). As I note below, there may be conditions under which 
arbitrators do indeed develop something akin to precedent. Infra text accompanying notes 
197–213. 
135. See supra text accompanying notes 119–126. 
136. E.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596–97 (1991) 
(upholding forum selection clause requiring residents of Washington State to litigate in 
Florida). 
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of empirical questions about the contents of arbitration agreements, the role played 
by arbitration providers, and the participants in consumer and employment 
arbitrations.137 For example, to what extent do businesses include individuating 
terms in their agreements? How effectively and consistently do arbitration 
providers enforce their due process protocols?138 How frequently do lawyers 
represent consumers in arbitration proceedings, and what are the characteristics of 
those lawyers?139 Are there conditions under which written, reasoned awards will 
produce something akin to precedent in arbitration? Without answers to these 
questions, it is difficult to assess how accurately the individuation critique 
describes modern consumer and employment arbitration. 
Moreover, a full assessment of the individuation critique requires more 
than an accurate description of current arbitration practices. We must also consider 
arbitration’s potential to facilitate aggregation. In the rest of this article, I argue 
that arbitration may have a great deal of potential. This is especially true for 
consumers, who except for the class action have little ability to aggregate their 
claims or to benefit from lawyers’ aggregation efforts.140 The remainder of this 
paper describes some ways that arbitration might achieve this potential, focusing 
on consumer disputes. Some of my suggestions are hypothetical and require that 
we rethink or revise current arbitration practices. But others may already be 
features of arbitration. Taken together, they suggest a system that, for many 
consumers, may prove superior to the courts in important respects. 
                                                                                                                
137. Answering these questions requires more than examining the results of 
arbitration proceedings, though that research is essential as well. See supra note 98 for a 
description of the existing research on arbitration outcomes, which primarily deals with 
employment arbitration. 
138. With respect to the AAA, for example, we do not know whether it routinely 
conducts an adequate, independent review of the governing agreement before accepting a 
case for arbitration. In theory, specially trained AAA staff review the arbitration agreement 
at the start of the arbitration, identify any non-conforming terms, and give the business the 
opportunity to waive the term or revise the agreement. See FAIR PLAY, supra note 114, at 
33–34; see also CONSUMER RULES, supra note 113, R. C-2(a) (requiring claimant to attach 
agreement to arbitration demand). I know of no data on how effectively this process screens 
out non-conforming arbitration agreements. Further research, and improved disclosure by 
providers, is needed to answer this question. See CAL. DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., 
CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF WEBSITE DATA 
POSTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 1281.96 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26–32 (2004) 
[hereinafter CDRI REVIEW], available at http://www.mediate.com/cdri/cdri_print_ 
Aug_6.pdf (noting problems with providers’ data reporting pursuant to California statute). 
139. There is some, albeit weak, evidence that consumer claimants are finding 
lawyers in arbitration. California law requires arbitration providers to make public 
information about certain consumer, employment, and health care arbitrations. See CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West Supp. 2006). One recent study of this data found that 
79.5% of the consumer-initiated arbitrations were commenced by a lawyer. See CDRI 
REVIEW, supra note 138, at 20, 26–32 (also noting problems with data reporting). Following 
California law, however, the study broadly defines “consumer” to include employment, real 
estate, insurance, and other disputes, and many of the claims involved amounts (reported in 
only a minority of arbitrations) large enough to attract a lawyer: $90,341 (mean) and 
$19,800 (median). Id. at 20. 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 55–81. 
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It may seem counterintuitive to argue that arbitration has the potential to 
be a superior forum for aggregation of consumer claims. After all, how can a 
system supposedly controlled by more powerful interests be more favorable to 
consumer litigants? I address this objection in the last section. 
II. RETHINKING THE ABILITY TO AGGREGATE DISPUTES IN 
ARBITRATION 
A. Class Arbitration as a Laboratory for Innovation in Formal Aggregation 
Although it may turn out to be a short-lived phenomenon,141 class 
arbitration is the most obvious example of arbitration’s potential to facilitate 
aggregate dispute resolution. Achieving this potential, however, may require that 
we reimagine current class arbitration practices. I do not want to describe the AAA 
class arbitration rules in detail. Suffice to say that they largely imitate federal class 
action practice.142 So do the rules adopted by JAMS, the only other major ADR 
provider (to my knowledge) with class arbitration rules.143 Given the variety of 
unanswered questions raised by class arbitration,144 perhaps providers can be 
forgiven for offering a familiar set of procedural rules.145 Unfortunately, these 
rules largely fail to engage with the possibilities of class arbitration. 
For example, AAA rules parrot the predominance inquiry of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), asking whether common questions of law or fact 
predominate over questions affecting only individual class members.146 The point 
of this inquiry is to decide whether class members’ claims are sufficiently alike to 
                                                                                                                
141. For example, some businesses may seek to eliminate classwide proceedings 
altogether by appending class action prohibitions to their arbitration agreements, or, if 
courts prove unwilling to enforce such prohibitions, may channel class actions into court. 
As I discuss below, however, it is also possible that class arbitration is here to stay. See 
infra text accompanying notes 173–188. 
142. For a truncated discussion of that practice in consumer cases, see supra text 
accompanying notes 68–81. 
143. The JAMS rules are also available on-line. JAMS, JAMS Class Action 
Procedures, http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/class_action.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). For 
a thorough discussion of provider rules and due process issues raised by class arbitration, 
see Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185 (2006). 
144. For example, what, if any, due process rights do absent class members and 
defendants have? To what extent and under what conditions will the award bind absent class 
members? What is the court’s role in supervising a class arbitration? 
145. Indeed, the decision to model class arbitration rules on FED. R. CIV. P. 23 
may reflect little more than the AAA’s ambivalence. See Russ Bleemer, The Current State 
of Class Action Arbitration, 22 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 63, 68–69 (2004) 
(summarizing comments by William K. Slate II, president and CEO of the AAA, that 
although the AAA had on occasion administered class arbitration referred by courts, they 
“never asked for” the increase in class arbitration occasioned by Green Tree Financial 
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003)). It may also merely reflect the tendency of lawyers 
and courts to favor familiar procedures. 
146. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS 
ARBITRATIONS R. 4(b) (2003) [hereinafter AAA CLASS RULES], available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936; JAMS, JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES R. 3(b)(3) 
(2005), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/class_action.asp. 
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warrant collective, representative adjudication,147 or, under another view, whether 
formal aggregation will promote efficiency without sacrificing fairness.148 These 
are necessary questions in any adjudicative context, but there is no reason why 
they should yield the same answers in arbitration and litigation. Yet that is what 
the AAA rules seem to suggest.149 In effect, the AAA class rules encourage 
arbitrators to view a class arbitration merely as a class action that happens to occur 
in arbitration. 
This is a remarkably impoverished view of class arbitration, one that 
views arbitration as little more than a private court system and arbitrators as little 
more than judicial impersonators. But arbitration has potential, in part, precisely 
because arbitrators are not judges. Subject to constraints imposed by the parties’ 
agreement, arbitrators, unlike judges, have great flexibility to fashion an 
appropriate remedy150 and to adopt efficient procedures that are tailored to the 
parties’ dispute.151 There is no reason why this authority should vanish once the 
arbitrator contemplates collective dispute resolution procedures. At least in theory, 
such procedures need bear little resemblance to the class action, and, even under a 
more limited view, federal class action practice should inform—but rarely 
dictate—class arbitration practice. 
Exactly how arbitrators should approach the decision to certify a class is a 
complex topic, and one that is tangential to my purposes.152 But it is one worth 
                                                                                                                
147. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). 
148. John Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 401 (2000) (disputing that 
predominance inquiry asks about class cohesion and locating purposes of requirement in 
concerns for judicial efficiency). 
149. For example, in one class arbitration, a panel of arbitrators declined to certify 
a class of franchisees, operators of retail art galleries, who alleged that franchisor 
representatives misrepresented the likely profitability of their businesses at a series of 
meetings. The panel reasoned that “[c]lass action status is generally denied in cases alleging 
verbal fraud because of the need for individualized proof on key factual issues, including 
the making of the misrepresentations, materiality, reliance and damages.” Class 
Determination Award at 6, Tarek, LLC v. Kincade, No. 11 Y 114 00578 04 (Apr. 4, 2005) 
(Am. Arbitration Ass’n), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1896. 
150. See supra note 133. Arbitrators may also be constrained by provider rules, of 
course. For example, the Consumer Rules instruct arbitrators to apply pertinent substantive 
law. See CONSUMER RULES, supra note 113, R. C-7(c). 
151. On arbitrators’ authority to control arbitration procedure, see, e.g., Keebler 
Co. v. Truck Drivers, Local 170, 247 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2001); InterChem Asia 2000 Pte. 
Ltd. v. Oceana Petrochemicals AG, 373 F. Supp. 2d 340, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); M&L 
Power Servs., Inc. v. Am. Networks Int’l, 44 F. Supp. 2d 134, 142–44 (D.R.I. 1999). If 
arbitrators have great flexibility to fashion substantive relief, see, e.g., George Watts & Son, 
Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580–81 (7th Cir. 2001); Ware, supra note 133, at 711, 
they should have at least as much flexibility to fashion arbitration procedure. If the 
agreement does not forbid a particular procedure, the arbitrator should, in theory, be free to 
use it, unless perhaps the process violates some fundamental notion of what is fair in 
arbitration or permissible as a matter of policy. 
152. Also separate issues are the many potential objections to class arbitration, 
beginning with normative objections to the wholesale privatization of justice. For example, 
one might argue that juries, not arbitrators, should decide whether the conduct of an 
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exploring.153 The flexibility and informality of arbitration do not make it 
unsuitable for class litigation;154 quite the contrary. These attributes permit 
arbitrators to implement innovative procedures that courts have been hesitant to 
accept.155 
Consider once more my example of car buyers who purchase a theft-
protection “warranty.”156 I mentioned earlier that class certification was unlikely in 
court, because, to a judge, questions of misrepresentation, reliance, and damages 
all require individualized proof.157 This insistence on individualized proof reflects 
an almost entirely individuated view of adjudication, one that rejects the use of 
collective proof even if it is the most efficient method—perhaps even the only 
economically feasible one—to resolve large numbers of similar disputes. For 
example, it is unlikely that a judge would agree to estimate that an actionable 
misrepresentation occurred in 40 percent of, say, 1,000 transactions, causing an 
average loss of $500, and to devise some formula for allocating the resulting 
$200,000 judgment among class members. At the risk of oversimplifying, the goal 
of a class action in court is to find out which class members relied to their 
detriment on a salesperson’s misrepresentation and to award to those class 
members (and no others) the appropriate relief.158 
                                                                                                                
employer or business violates the broader community values underlying applicable law. See, 
e.g., Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1999) (“[T]he absence of a jury makes arbitration an inappropriate forum for 
resolving claims that derive from an employer’s violation of external community values.”). 
153. Recent scholarship has begun to address the many questions raised by class 
arbitration, but has not addressed the standards arbitrators should apply to class certification 
decisions, nor the range of aggregative procedures that might be available in arbitration. 
Examples of scholarship addressing class arbitration, or the use of arbitration to avoid class 
actions, include Kristen M. Blankley, Class Actions Behind Closed Doors? How Consumer 
Claims Can (and Should) be Resolved by Class-Action Arbitration, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 451 (2005); Buckner, supra note 143; Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral 
Paradigm of Classwide Arbitration: Arbitral Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. L. 
REV. 301 (2004–2005); Gilles, supra note 90; Sternlight, supra note 70; Jack Wilson, “No-
Class-Action Arbitration Clauses,” State-Law Unconscionability, and the Federal 
Arbitration Act: A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737 (2005). 
154. See Bales, supra note 152, at 2 (“[A]rbitration’s informality makes it an 
inadequate forum for resolving large, complex, class-based claims.”). 
155. In this sense, class arbitration may be more akin to an estimation proceeding 
in a bankruptcy case involving mass tort claims than to a judicial class action. Bankruptcy 
judges have exercised substantial discretion in devising efficient methods for estimating the 
debtor’s aggregate liability to a class of individual claimants. See, e.g., In re Eagle-Picher 
Indus., Inc., 189 B.R. 681 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995); In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742 
(E.D. Va. 1988). 
156. Supra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 75–78. 
158. This goal arguably conflicts with the reality of large-scale litigation—
perhaps even with the reality of any routine form of litigation, such as personal injury 
litigation—in which individual claims are typically resolved by settlement according to 
essentially actuarial principles. E.g., Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 19, at 1618, 1625–31. 
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An arbitrator, by contrast, might ask the following, very different 
question: Is it consistent with the parties’ agreement to resolve this dispute in a 
collective fashion and, if so, what type of process is fair, efficient, and consistent 
with the remedial purposes of the relevant substantive law?159 Answering this 
question, the arbitrator might decide to hold an initial hearing to resolve common 
issues,160 followed by hearings on the merits for a representative sample of car 
buyers, the results of which would then be extrapolated to the class as a whole. 
Thus, after finding in favor of 40 percent of the sample claimants, the arbitrator 
might award $200,000 to the class (again, assuming a class of 1,000 and an 
average award of $500).161 After fixing the defendant’s aggregate liability, and 
perhaps discharging it from the case, the arbitrator might devise procedures for 
allocating funds among class members, might rely on other ADR processes like 
mediation to allocate funds, or might simply allocate funds pro rata.162 
The foregoing is only one example modeled on trial plans that have been 
proposed (though rarely accepted) in judicial proceedings.163 But the fact that 
courts use such procedures rarely, if at all, should not be determinative. Many of 
the constraints that shape class action practice in court do not apply to arbitration: 
                                                                                                                
159. Because most arbitration agreements will not specify arbitration procedures, 
much less procedures for collective adjudication, the parties effectively delegate to the 
arbitrator the authority to devise appropriate dispute resolution procedures, much the same 
as they have delegated the authority to fashion an appropriate remedy. See supra note 151. 
160. See supra note 77 for examples of common issues. 
161. For arguments in favor of applying similar techniques in court, especially in 
the mass tort context, see David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) 
Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 31–33 [hereinafter 
Rosenberg, Cost Without Benefit]; David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and 
Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 
1892–97 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Decoupling]; Laurens Walker & John Monahan, 
Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545 (1998); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, 
Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329 (1999). 
162. In most consumer cases, it seems unlikely that a pro rata distribution would 
result in significant numbers of opt-outs, given the relatively modest stakes involved and the 
expense of individual adjudication. (Though, as I argue, infra text accompanying notes 189–
224, arbitration may be a more hospitable forum than the courts for resolving individual 
consumer claims.) One might object that a pro-rata distribution to claimants will 
overcompensate some and undercompensate others. There are two short answers to this 
objection. First, an arbitrator could devise simplified procedures for distributing proceeds 
according to some relevant metric—severity of harm, strength of claim, etc.—without 
conducting extensive (and expensive) fact-finding. Second, an arbitrator could legitimately 
conclude that a pro-rata distribution is consistent with the parties’ agreement. Arguably, 
consumers benefit by trading expensive, individualized procedures for simplified 
procedures that produce higher net proceeds for allocation. Cf. Rosenberg, Decoupling, 
supra note 161, at 1885–87 (arguing, in mass tort context, that plaintiffs would prefer, ex 
ante, a system that distributes proceeds according to severity of loss rather than strength of 
claim). 
163. Compare Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786–87 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(approving use of sampling to measure damages in suit under Torture Victim Protection 
Act), with Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 151 F.3d 297, 311 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that trial 
plan based on statistical sampling violated state law, due process, and the right to a jury 
trial). 
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The right to trial by jury in class actions seeking damages is an example.164 And 
those that do apply may mean something quite different to an arbitrator than to a 
judge. So even if there is a right to due process in arbitration,165 which includes, 
say, the right to obtain essential discovery,166 no one would suggest that arbitrators 
follow Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37. That is because, although 
arbitrators may order substantial discovery in appropriate cases, implementing 
federal discovery practice would compromise arbitration’s virtues—informality 
and efficiency chief among them167—without offering a commensurate benefit. 
There is likewise no reason to compromise these virtues in the class certification 
decision. 
This is not to say that class arbitration should be a free-for-all. Arbitrators 
should ensure that class representatives and counsel will adequately represent the 
class, that they have no material conflicts of interest, and that class members have 
adequate notice and opportunities to participate in the arbitration.168 Beyond that, 
                                                                                                                
164. An arbitration agreement, of course, relinquishes that right. That is why 
some have suggested that arbitration agreements be judged by a “knowing, voluntary, and 
intentional” standard. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the 
Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
669, 676 (2001). But see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and 
Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Winter/Spring 2004, at 167, 167–68 (defending use of contract-law standards of assent). 
165. At least in individual arbitrations, most courts hold that there is no right to 
due process. See Buckner, supra note 143, at 214–16. See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, 
Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REV. 7; Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional 
Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 
UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the 
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, 
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 38 (1997). 
166. Cf. Norman v. Young, 422 F.2d 470, 474 (10th Cir. 1970) (affirming default 
judgment granted as sanction for withholding discovery materials and asserting that default 
judgment protected plaintiff’s right to due process). 
167. See Wilson, supra note 153, at 779 (noting these strengths). As should be 
obvious, I disagree with the view that arbitration’s “relative efficiency, low cost, informality 
and flexibility, and privacy [] are likely to be substantially diminished or even eliminated in 
the class action context.” Id. A class arbitration is surely less efficient, more costly, etc. than 
one individual arbitration, but that seems the wrong comparison. Compared to a 
(hypothetical) multitude of individual arbitrations or lawsuits, class arbitration may offer 
significant efficiency and other advantages. Nor is it obvious that these advantages 
disappear when we compare class arbitration to class litigation. To be sure, current class 
arbitration rules sacrifice much of arbitration’s potential advantage by slavishly adhering to 
federal class action practice (and by contemplating a multitude of essentially interlocutory 
appeals). But these procedures could be refined to make class arbitration a more efficient 
and flexible process. 
168. Without such protections, it seems unlikely that a class arbitration award 
would bind absent class members. To the extent Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 
U.S. 444 (2003), implicitly approves class arbitration in at least some cases, see supra note 
5, it follows that absent class members can be bound by such proceedings. But it is unclear 
exactly how they are bound. Does a court order confirming the award bind them if the 
motion to confirm is filed by the arbitration class representative? Must the court itself 
certify a class on the common question of whether the award should be confirmed or 
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arbitration procedures should be fair to all parties—providing, for defendants, a 
dispassionate assessment of liability, a reasonably accurate measure of any 
damages owed to the class as a whole,169 and a judgment that binds class members. 
But as long as they honor these restrictions, and any lawfully imposed by the 
parties’ agreement, arbitrators need not mimic judges in deciding whether to 
certify a class.170 
The AAA class arbitrations suggest that at least some arbitrators 
recognize that they have a good deal of procedural flexibility, though perhaps not 
to the degree I am suggesting.171 Indeed, both arbitration proponents and skeptics, 
each of whom often take for granted that arbitration will individuate disputes, 
should acknowledge, even welcome, the potential benefits of class arbitration. 
Properly administered, class arbitration could preserve many of arbitration’s 
traditional virtues—efficiency, expert decision-making, flexible procedure—while 
enabling claimants to capture litigation economies and to compete with 
respondents on relatively even terms.172 
                                                                                                                
vacated? Or will subsequent courts and arbitrators simply give preclusive effect to a prior 
class arbitration award, no matter how (or whether) it is confirmed? For a brief discussion 
of similar issues in class arbitration, see Kristen M. Blankley, Res Judicata and Class 
Action Arbitration Awards, 4 MAYHEW-HITE REP. ON DISP. RESOL. & CTS. (2005–2006), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/jdr/mayhew-hite/vol4iss1/lead.html. 
169. E.g., Rosenberg, supra note 161, at 1892–97 (arguing in mass tort context for 
separating deterrence and compensation functions, first assessing the defendant’s liability 
and damages in the aggregate, then distributing according to severity of loss). 
170. To some extent, of course, class arbitration rules constrain arbitrators’ 
procedural options. But I do not interpret the current rules to preclude all procedural 
innovation in class arbitration. Although the rules are modeled on FED. R. CIV. P. 23, that 
does not mean that an arbitrator must follow federal case law in deciding, say, whether 
statistical sampling is both fair and consistent with the parties’ agreement. As I have 
mentioned, many of the principles that inform the case law have limited, or no, relevance to 
arbitration. See supra text accompanying notes 164–167. 
171. As one arbitrator reasoned in certifying a class of physicians challenging an 
insurer’s reimbursement practices: 
If it is found that [the insurer engaged in a scheme to underpay 
physicians], then how [the scheme] affected various members of the 
class will have to be dealt with. If all of these contracts were breached, 
then a remedy will be found. Procedures could be subclasses within this 
arbitration, separate arbitrations, or some combination thereof. . . . 
Arbitration is a flexible tool and I am confident that when and if that 
point is reached, good management will handle the individual claims in a 
fair and expeditious manner. Since the alternative, denying the class, is 
essentially to deny these doctors any realistic possibility of redress, I 
believe that we should go ahead and do the best we can. 
Partial Final Class Determination Award of Arbitrator at 11–12, Sutter v. Oxford Health 
Plans, No. 18 193 20593 02 (Mar. 24, 2005) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n), available at 
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1835. In another, more problematic, example, an arbitrator 
certified an opt-out class of employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which permits 
only opt-in collective actions. See Class Determination Partial Final Award at 4–10, Cole v. 
Long John Silver’s Rests., No. 11 160 00194 04 (Sept. 19, 2005) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n), 
available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=2011. 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 35–37. 
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Of course, arbitrators must honor contractual limits on their authority, 
which raises an obvious objection: Won’t businesses simply revise their 
agreements expressly to prohibit class proceedings? Arbitration skeptics often 
assume that such clauses will become common,173 but this may be unduly 
pessimistic. To be sure, some businesses, especially in the consumer finance and 
telecommunications industries, appear to view arbitration as a means to eliminate 
class litigation, and these businesses may expressly prohibit class actions in their 
agreements.174 Except for one study, however, there is little evidence of the 
frequency with which such prohibitions appear in consumer contracts.175 As I 
discuss below in the context of individual arbitration, consumers and consumer 
advocates ultimately may have significant influence over arbitration procedures176 
and over whether businesses use arbitration agreements in the first place.177 Over 
the long-term, whether businesses will routinely seek to contract around the class 
action remains an open empirical question. 
Of course, to the extent arbitration agreements include terms prohibiting 
class actions, there remains the normative question whether such terms should be 
enforced. A minority of the reported cases hold that class action prohibitions will 
be invalid in at least some circumstances.178 A great deal has been written about 
the role of the class action in securing the enforcement of public law, and I will not 
repeat that discussion here.179 For my purposes, it is enough to recognize that class 
action prohibitions can effectively eliminate private rights of action granted by 
important public laws, and that a principled argument can be made in favor of 
judicial or legislative intervention to prevent this from happening. 
Assuming businesses cannot contract around the class action altogether, 
of course, they may elect to arbitrate only individual disputes, channeling class 
actions into court. In fact, some lawyers for businesses engaged in consumer 
transactions have expressed distaste for class arbitration.180 This is not surprising; 
                                                                                                                
173. E.g., Gilles, supra note 90, at 410; Sternlight, supra note 70, at 90–91. 
174. As I mentioned earlier, supra note 102, of the sixteen consumer arbitration 
agreements I located from the AAA class arbitrations, five expressly bar class actions. All 
five of these agreements involve businesses in the consumer finance or telecommunications 
industries. 
175. See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 101, at 65. 
176. See infra text accompanying notes 239–246. 
177. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. 
178. E.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005); 
Muhammad v. County Bank, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 
S.E.2d 265, 278–80 (W. Va. 2002); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 
1166, 1178–79 (W.D. Wash. 2002). Arguably, the arbitrator should decide whether to 
enforce a ban on class proceedings, but that is a topic for a different article. The Supreme 
Court has yet to decide whether the FAA requires courts to enforce contract terms 
prohibiting class arbitration. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 455–60 
(2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that FAA requires enforcement of contracts 
“according to their terms,” including contract term dissent interpreted to bar class actions). 
179. E.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 21 (1996). 
180. See The Current State of Class Action Arbitration, supra note 145, at 67–68 
(reporting comment attributed to attorney Alan Kaplinsky—who can fairly be described as a 
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class arbitration is an unfamiliar phenomenon, and current AAA rules do little to 
make it efficient or cost-effective. But under a more rational set of class arbitration 
rules, it is at least conceivable that some businesses, like consumers, might benefit 
from properly-administered class arbitration.  
While there are limits to a business’s ability to dictate arbitration 
procedure,181 it can structure the class arbitration process to eliminate or reduce 
many of its likely objections to class actions.182 For example, an arbitration 
agreement could significantly (and in my view, legitimately) reduce the scope of 
discovery,183 substantially reducing the cost of arbitration. It could also replace a 
lay jury with an expert decision-maker,184 possibly reducing the expected amount 
of any award,185 and it could provide a further hedge against large and 
unpredictable awards by calling for de novo review.186 Moreover, many of the 
uncertainties now present in class arbitration will be removed as arbitrators and 
courts process the disputes now in the system.187 If the class action does survive, at 
                                                                                                                
proponent of predispute arbitration agreements—that he advises clients to include terms 
declaring the entire arbitration agreement void if a court or arbitrator finds the class action 
prohibition to be unenforceable). 
181. See infra text accompanying notes 232–248 (describing how those 
procedures evolve, in part, in response to other forces). 
182. Contract parties also may tailor judicial procedures, though to a lesser extent. 
Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure 
Negotiable (Accepted Paper Series, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=888221. 
183. Although arbitrators may order substantial discovery in appropriate cases, 
the scope of discovery will likely be much more limited in arbitration, whether or not the 
agreement imposes additional (and enforceable) restrictions. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b),  
with COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 130, R. 21, and AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N.,  
COMMERCIAL RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, 
COMPLEX COMMERCIAL DISPUTES) L3 & L4 (2005), available at http://www.adr.org/ 
sp.asp?id=22440. 
184. Cf. Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 
53, 66–67 (2001) (noting reasons to doubt jurors’ capacity to resolve complex issues in high 
stakes cases). 
185. There is some evidence from individual arbitrations that award amounts may 
be lower in arbitration than in litigation. E.g., Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra 
note 27, at 199–200; Sherwyn et al., supra note 27, at 1576. Whether or not this is true of 
class arbitration, arbitrators may be less likely than juries to award extravagant amounts. 
186. This review could take place before a panel of arbitrators, see FAIR PLAY, 
supra note 114, at 21, or, perhaps, in court, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting 
Around RUAA: Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 3 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 419, 426–33 (2003). 
187. Ultimately, cost may be the most significant barrier to class arbitration, as 
arbitrators must be paid for their time. But the arbitration agreement can limit or offset these 
costs, for example by limiting discovery or by capping the length of the arbitration hearing. 
Moreover, current provider rules increase the cost of class arbitration by providing for a 
series of essentially interlocutory appeals. See, e.g., AAA Class Rules, supra note 146, R. 3 
& 5. These rules should be changed, as they needlessly complicate the process and may 
significantly increase the expense of class arbitration. 
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least some businesses might benefit by choosing tailored class arbitration 
procedures over the off-the-rack class action procedures in court.188 
B. Aggregation in Individual Disputes 
Notwithstanding my analysis in the prior section, it is possible that class 
arbitration will be a short-lived phenomenon.189 If that is true, many consumers 
will have to assert claims, if at all, in individual arbitrations. Yet even in individual 
arbitration, we should not assume that arbitration necessarily will individuate the 
disputing process. In a number of ways, individual arbitration might facilitate the 
informal aggregation of consumer claims. 
1. Reduced Cost 
An obvious and frequently noted potential benefit of arbitration is 
reduced cost and time of dispute resolution. These potential benefits may not 
induce repeat-player lawyers to accept consumer arbitration cases, especially if 
fewer cases are settled in arbitration than in court.190 And to the extent arbitration 
awards tend to be lower than jury verdicts,191 lawyers may be less willing to accept 
cases on a contingency basis,192 unless they win more frequently in arbitration.193 
Yet repeat-player lawyers are already unlikely to accept large numbers of 
consumer cases, even those destined for court.194 If arbitration costs less and yields 
generally favorable results, it at least raises the possibility that lawyers might build 
practices around handling large volumes of relatively low-value claims.195 This 
would be a clear benefit to consumer claimants.196 
                                                                                                                
188. To a degree, of course, parties may of course customize the procedures and 
remedies that will be available to them in court. But arbitration offers significantly greater 
opportunities for customization. E.g., Moffitt, supra note 182. 
189. Supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
190. See, e.g., Sherwyn et al., supra note 27, at 1575 (noting in employment 
context that reduced cost and faster disposition may increase lawyers’ willingness to take 
cases, but that reduced defense costs might make settlement less likely). 
191. See supra note 185. 
192. Much, though not all, of the premium lawyers obtain from contingency fee 
practice may derive from the top 10–20% of case recoveries. See Kritzer, Seven Dogged 
Myths, supra note 40, at 766–68, 772. To the extent arbitration reduces expected recoveries, 
lawyers may be less willing to accept arbitration cases. See Bingham, The Repeat Player 
Effect, supra note 27, at 199–200. 
193. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 27, at 1567–69 (discussing studies of win-rate 
in employment arbitration); see also supra note 98 (discussing Ernst & Young Study of 
consumer arbitration). 
194. See supra text accompanying notes 57–67. 
195. See Frederic N. Smalkin & Frederick N.C. Smalkin, The Market for Justice, 
the “Litigation Explosion,” and the “Verdict Bubble”: A Closer Look at Vanishing Trials, 
2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 8, 40 (2005) (“[T]he speed and low cost . . . [of] arbitration . . . may 
work in favor of the plaintiff’s attorney who handles a large volume of cases and/or is 
underwriting costs for an impecunious clientele.”). 
196. The frequency with which consumers are represented by lawyers in 
arbitration, and the characteristics of those lawyers (repeat player vs. one-shotter), are 
important areas for further study. See supra note 139. 
2007] ARBITRATION  103
2. Development of Precedent 
It is routine to hear that arbitrators neither follow nor create precedent.197 
And there is no doubt some truth to this. But there is also some reason to believe 
that, over time, arbitrators’ decisions may come to form what Professor Richard 
Reuben has called “collective arbitral wisdom.”198 For that to happen, of course, 
arbitrators may need to issue reasoned awards. Some ADR providers now 
encourage or require this in consumer and employment cases.199 
Whether or not these awards become public,200 they increase the 
likelihood that information about arbitration results will spread among consumers 
and their lawyers.201 And, in turn, arbitrators will become better informed about 
how their peers have decided particular issues. As a result, although not bound by 
prior decisions, arbitrators might develop a consensus about how to interpret 
particular contract terms or how to view particular business practices. One can 
imagine, for example, a consistent pattern of awards finding that a particular 
business model—say, providing an up-front cash “rebate” and nominal access to 
internet services in exchange for a consumer’s agreement to make substantial 
monthly payments—constitutes consumer lending activity subject to state usury 
law.202 
Indeed, the AAA class arbitrations offer an example of how such a 
consensus might develop. The AAA Class Rules call for a clause construction 
award, in which the arbitrator determines whether the parties’ agreement permits 
class arbitration.203 These awards are available to the public, and of course they are 
of great interest to the lawyers involved in these cases. So far, arbitrators have 
                                                                                                                
197. See Alderman, supra note 68, at 1242; Baruch Bush, supra note 132, at 988–
89; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 37 (noting that lack of reasoned or written 
opinions may individuate disputing process). 
198. Reuben, supra note 89, at 1085. 
199. The AAA Employment Rules, for example, require arbitrators to state “the 
written reasons” for their award, unless the parties agree otherwise, and also make redacted 
versions of awards available to the public on a cost basis and on the AAA website. 
EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 113, R. 34; see also CONSUMER RULES, supra note 113, 
R. C-7 (only requiring that the award be in writing); CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 111, 
Principle 15 (requiring arbitrator, upon timely request of either party, to provide brief 
written explanation of basis for award); JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 115, 
Standard No. 8 (providing for “concise written statement” of reasons for award); JAMS 
CONSUMER POLICY, supra note 115, para. 10 (same). But see NAF CODE OF PROCEDURE, 
supra note 116, R. 37(H) (awards to be “summary awards” unless the parties agree 
otherwise, or unless a party requests findings of fact and conclusions of law and pays a fee). 
200. Even if not made publicly available by the ADR provider, in many 
circumstances, the award would become public if the prevailing party sought a court order 
confirming it. See Reuben, supra note 89, at 1086. 
201. See id. at 1085 (noting that spread of information may offset repeat-players’ 
advantage in arbitration); Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 27, at 218–19 
(noting that repeat-player lawyers might gather information on arbitrators and make other 
investments in intellectual capital). 
202. See State ex rel. Cooper v. NCCS Loans, Inc., 624 S.E.2d 371, 377 (N.C. 
App. 2005). 
203. See AAA Class Rules, supra note 146, R. 3. 
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issued clause construction awards in thirty-one consumer and employment cases, 
and in all but one they have interpreted the agreement to permit class 
certification.204 Now, even judges have limited use for precedent in interpreting 
actual contract language. Yet while acknowledging they were not bound by other 
arbitrators’ interpretations of other contracts, some arbitrators have discerned, and 
followed, a “national pattern of clause construction awards.”205 And even when 
they assign little weight to prior clause construction awards, the cases show the 
arbitrators engaging with those awards much like one trial judge might engage 
                                                                                                                
204. Perhaps this consistency can be attributed to arbitrators’ presumed tendency 
to issue rulings that favor their continued jurisdiction (and collection of fees). E.g., 
Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. Int’l Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568, 573–74 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, 
J., dissenting); Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in International 
Arbitration: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Come From Nothing?, 13 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 19, 27 (2002). But in a number of cases arbitrators who interpreted the 
agreement to permit class arbitration subsequently denied certification, dismissed the 
arbitration on the merits, or otherwise ruled contrary to their presumed economic interests. 
E.g., Class Certification Award of Arbitrator, Milstein v. Protection One Alarm Servs., Inc., 
No. 11 110 00270 04 (May 12, 2005) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n), available at 
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1876 (denying class certification); Award on Motions (i) for 
Summary Disposition and (ii) For Posting of Bond at 16–24, Rhodes College Inc. v. Satz, 
No. 11 181 02217 04 (July 5, 2005) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n), available at 
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=2133 (granting motion to dismiss); Award on (i) Clause 
Construction, and (ii) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at 8–11, Warrior 
Transportation v. FFE Transp. Servs. Inc., No. 11 118 00365 05 (Aug. 18, 2005) (Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1966 (invalidating entire 
arbitration agreement—not a consumer or employment case); Partial Final Clause 
Construction Award, Budner v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., No. 11 181 00828 04 (Dec. 
20, 2004) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1721 
(interpreting agreement to require dispute to be brought in court). 
In any event, an arbitrator seeking only to maximize fees might think it strategically 
unwise to prolong class arbitrations. Presumably, these arbitrators derive some (probably 
most) of their fees from commercial arbitrations between businesses. Class arbitration 
respondents and their lawyers are likely to be repeat players in these business-to-business 
disputes and can discipline “pro-claimant” arbitrators not only by denying them future class 
arbitration work, but by denying them future work in commercial disputes as well. By 
contrast, the plaintiffs’ class action firms that represent claimants in class arbitrations may 
appear infrequently in business-to-business disputes. These are all assumptions, of course, 
but they seem at least plausible. 
205. Clause Construction Award at 14–17, Awe v. I&M Rail Link, LLC, No. 11 
160 00026 05 (May 4, 2005) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n), available at http://www.adr.org/ 
si.asp?id=1938; Clause Construction Award at 3 & app., Grayson v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 
No. 11 160 01823 04 (Aug. 8, 2005) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n), available at 
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1947 (listing decisions by other arbitrators); see also Clause 
Construction Award at 2, Ali v. Morton’s of Chicago/Sacramento, Inc., No. 11 160 02015 
05, (Mar. 22, 2006) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n), available at http://www.adr.org/ 
si.asp?id=2177 (referencing the “vast majority of clause construction awards”); Partial Final 
Clause Construction Award of Arbitrator at 9–11, Petsch v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 
No. 11 181 02541 04 (Aug. 31, 2005) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n), available at 
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=2153 (discussing award in similar dispute and court’s ruling 
declining to vacate that award). 
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with another’s opinion in a similar case.206 We should not automatically equate 
class arbitration to the arbitration experiences of individual consumers, nor should 
we assume that clause construction awards are typical examples of arbitral 
decision-making. Nonetheless, the class arbitrations suggest that, with an active 
plaintiffs’ bar, reasoned awards, and rapid exchange of information about 
arbitration results, arbitration may produce a body of law that is essentially 
“public”—i.e., a set of publicly available principles that convey information about 
the arbitration process and guide decision-making in future cases. 
In fact, arbitrators themselves may have professional values conducive to 
the development of a “public” body of law. These values might include a desire to 
transmit knowledge to future arbitrators, to demystify the process for lawyers who 
are skeptical of arbitration, or to communicate the nature of the arbitration process 
to the public or to policymakers. Labor arbitration offers an example of how a 
private dispute resolution system can create “public” law in this fashion. Like the 
Restatements of the Law, The Common Law of the Workplace, a standard 
reference in labor arbitration, attempts to distill a large body of “common law”—in 
this case the decisions of labor arbitrators—into a set of principles to guide future 
disputes.207 Although these principles are not formally binding, arbitrators may 
hesitate to depart from them in any significant way.208 Compared to labor 
arbitration, consumer and employment arbitration are relative newcomers, and it is 
possible that they will develop similar bodies of “public” law over time.209 The 
AAA’s decision to begin publishing its employment awards, even if in redacted 
form, is a modest step in that direction.210 
Indeed, there is a sense in which ADR providers already establish 
precedent, not just informal consensus. As I have explained, the AAA conducts an 
                                                                                                                
206. E.g., Clause Construction Award at 3, Hearthside v. Qwest Dex, Inc., 
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=1722 (noting two prior clause construction awards but 
describing them as “unhelpful” on the question whether state law relevant to this case, and 
the parties’ agreement, permitted class arbitration); Clause Construction Award at 25–28, 
Scher v. Oxford Health Plan, Inc., http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=2144 (dissent; noting more 
than twenty consistent clause construction awards, attempting to distinguish some of them, 
and finally expressing disagreement with the remainder). 
207. THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEWS OF ARBITRATORS 
(Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., 2d ed. 1998). 
208. E.g., Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: 
Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 501 (1976). According to Summers,  
[a]lthough arbitrators often cite to no other decisions in their opinion and 
never consider other cases as binding precedents, they usually are quite 
aware of the pattern of decisions by other arbitrators and are reluctant to 
deviate far from that pattern. Results in a discipline case may well 
depend on the length of the arbitrator’s foot, but that leads to relatively 
small differences, for there are few peg-legs or abominable snowmen 
among arbitrators, and no one follows in their footsteps. 
209. Cf. Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth 
and Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution”, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 907 
(2004) (noting development of public law attributes in securities arbitration). 
210. See supra note 199. 
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administrative review of each arbitration agreement prior to accepting a case.211 If 
an agreement does not substantially comply with the due process protocol, the 
business must either waive the offending term or amend its agreement.212 If the 
process works as designed, the due process rules—such as the rule against 
restrictions on remedies—effectively act as precedent applicable to all disputes 
administered by the provider. Perhaps consumer lawyers and advocates should 
press for a conception of arbitral “due process” that includes some procedure for 
multiple claimants to obtain binding rulings on merits issues as well. As I explain 
below, there is reason to believe provider rules may become more favorable to 
consumers over time.213 
3. Facilitating Award Collection 
Beyond reducing disputing costs and time and developing precedent, 
other policies, if implemented by ADR providers, would make arbitration more 
attractive to consumer claimants and repeat-player lawyers. One simple and 
effective reform would be for providers to decline to arbitrate disputes when a 
business has not paid, or sought a court order vacating, awards issued in favor of 
individual consumers. There is some precedent for such a procedure. The National 
Association of Securities Dealers has taken steps to reduce the number of unpaid 
securities arbitration awards issued on behalf of investor claimants.214 These steps 
include requiring NASD member broker–dealers to certify that they have paid 
outstanding awards and, in some cases, suspending the license of members who 
fail to pay.215 
                                                                                                                
211. See supra notes 114 & 138 and accompanying text. 
212. See FAIR PLAY, supra note 114, at 33–34. The consequences of AAA’s 
refusal to accept the case are unclear. Possibly, the business could still compel arbitration 
before another provider, but it might also find itself litigating the case (and all others under 
the agreement) in court. 
213. See infra text accompanying notes 232–248. 
214. In 2001, around 33% of NASD-administered monetary awards issued in 
favor of investors were not fully paid, down from 64% in 1998, and around 55% of awarded 
amounts remained unpaid, down from 80% in 1998. Most of the unpaid awards involved 
brokers who had left the securities industry. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-162R, 
FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON MATTERS RELATING TO SECURITIES ARBITRATION 3, 9–10 (2003) 
[hereinafter 2003 NASD REPORT]; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-
115, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS 
33–39 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 NASD REPORT] (discussing data on unpaid awards and 
NASD procedures); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-654R, EVALUATION OF STEPS 
TAKEN TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF UNPAID ARBITRATION AWARDS (2001) [hereinafter 
2001 NASD REPORT] (discussing steps taken to monitor award payment). 
215. See 2003 NASD REPORT, supra note 214, at 10. Some have questioned 
whether these steps adequately address the problem of unpaid securities arbitration awards. 
Per Jebsen, How to Fix Unpaid Arbitration Awards, 26 PACE L. REV. 183, 200–05 (2006). 
Most of the unpaid awards, however, involve broker–dealers who have left the securities 
industry, filed for bankruptcy, or challenged the award in court. See 2003 NASD REPORT, 
supra note 214, at 9–10 & tbl.1. Unpaid awards are a problem in any context, but these 
reasons for non-payment may have little to do with arbitration in general or with NASD 
rules in particular. 
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For individual consumers, such a policy would offer substantial benefits, 
potentially saving them the delay and expense involved in confirming the award216 
and invoking the judicial execution process,217 and thereby making consumer 
arbitration claims far more attractive to lawyers. Nor does it seem outlandish to 
expect ADR providers to adopt such policies, perhaps modeling them on those 
implemented by the NASD. Providers have already demonstrated a willingness to 
decline arbitrations where the agreement does not conform to their standards of 
fairness.218 Perhaps a reasonable conception of arbitral “due process” includes the 
notion that ADR providers should not lend their services to businesses who refuse 
to honor their awards. 
4. Punitive Damages and Other Remedies 
I have already mentioned the AAA’s assertion that it will not administer 
arbitrations under an agreement that prevents consumers from recovering punitive 
and other damages.219 That statement was made in an affidavit submitted by an 
AAA official in opposition to a subpoena seeking discovery of AAA documents.220 
Given that context, the statement may say more about the AAA’s desire to avoid 
discovery than it does about actual AAA policy. As I have said, I know of no data 
showing how consistently the AAA or other providers enforce their due process 
protocols.221 This is an area worthy of further study, although providers will have 
to make available the necessary data. Yet the AAA’s statement is a reasonable 
interpretation of the Consumer Protocol, and it sets a precedent that may influence, 
if not control, the analysis of other agreements. It suggests, moreover, that ADR 
providers can play a role in limiting businesses’ efforts to include “remedy 
stripping”222 terms in their arbitration agreements.223 
                                                                                                                
216. This is a significant point. While there is reason to believe that arbitration is 
less expensive than litigation for consumers, see supra text accompanying notes 190–196, 
an arbitration award must be confirmed by a court before it becomes a judgment 
enforceable by judicial process, see 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006). See also Thomas H. Oehmke, 
Arbitration Highways to the Courthouse: A Litigator’s Roadmap, 86 AM. JUR. Trials 111, 
§ 244 (2006). When comparing the cost (in dollars and time) of arbitration to litigation, 
then, the proper comparison may be between (1) the cost of arbitration plus the cost of 
judicial proceedings to confirm the award and (2) the cost of litigating the disputes on the 
merits. 
217. Unrepresented consumers in particular may struggle to understand and utilize 
the arcane execution process. See Abel, supra note 58, at 298. 
218. See, e.g., supra notes 114, 138. 
219. See supra text accompanying note 126. 
220. See supra note 126. 
221. See supra text accompanying note 138. 
222. Schwartz, supra note 101, at 49. 
223. Other suggested reforms are designed to limit repeat players’ potential 
advantage in arbitration, though not to induce repeat players into arbitration on behalf of 
consumers and employees. E.g., Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process 
Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369, 452–53 (2004) (suggesting disclosure of 
relationship between provider and other party, and option to file suit in court if the provider 
and repeat player have a relationship “that produces the appearance of partiality”). 
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5. Summary 
A less costly dispute resolution system that shares some aspects of a 
“public” legal system, facilitates award collection, and offers some protection from 
onerous contract terms would offer significant benefits to consumers. Returning 
once more to my theft-protection warranty example, even if class arbitration were 
unavailable, it is possible that consumers might find specialized lawyers willing to 
represent them in individual cases. Seeking to develop favorable rules, those 
lawyers might make significant litigation investments and seek to build an 
inventory of cases. The relative ease of collecting awards would further encourage 
lawyer participation, while making it easier for claimants who wished (or had no 
choice but) to represent themselves to do so. Claiming rates might increase, along 
with settlement rates,224 further reducing the cost of arbitration on a per-dispute 
basis. While imperfect, such a system would in many ways represent an 
improvement over the procedures available to individual consumer litigants in 
court. 
C. The Effect and Evolution of Provider Rules 
The cautiously optimistic view of arbitration underlying my prior 
discussion raises some obvious objections. For one thing, arbitration is 
contractual.225 A business can designate an ADR provider that will enforce its 
chosen terms, or it can forego a provider’s services and simply require the parties 
to designate an arbitrator from an acceptable list.226 For that matter, ADR 
providers compete fiercely for business.227 Providers that implement business-
friendly terms may have a competitive advantage. If that is true, why should we 
expect provider rules to become more favorable to consumers, rather than less? 
It seems likely, however, that businesses will continue using providers 
like the AAA. As growing arbitration caseloads suggest,228 businesses value 
providers’ services, which may include identifying and training potential 
arbitrators, handling case logistics, and promulgating off-the-rack arbitration 
procedures.229 No doubt the market for arbitration services is competitive,230 and 
                                                                                                                
224. To the extent arbitration yields predictable results in similar cases—and both 
precedent and easy award collection increase the likelihood that this will happen—one 
might expect settlement rates to increase. 
225. See Bales, supra note 88, at 602–04. 
226. See Bingham, supra note 88, at 239–43 (discussing how ADR provider rules 
can create a more balanced system but noting that drafters can avoid these protections by 
creating their own arbitration panels or contracting with alternative providers); Harding, 
supra note 223, at 421–22. 
227. Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of 
Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 52 (1999). 
228. E.g., Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The Privatization of Business and 
Commercial Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 KY. L.J. 183, 199 & n.43 
(2000) (describing increase in AAA and JAMS caseload in 1990s); Deborah R. Hensler, 
Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping 
Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 167 & n.11 (2003) (reporting increase in 
AAA caseload from 1990–2002). 
229. See Brunet, supra note 227, at 52–53 (also noting that bundling these 
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providers that implement unpopular policies risk losing business.231 So it would be 
foolish to expect providers to insist on rules that were unacceptable to their 
customers. But for several reasons providers may implement, and businesses may 
accept, reasonable arbitration reform. 
First, judicial scrutiny limits the extent to which providers can favor their 
business customers, and in fact may create pressure to increase the level of “due 
process” afforded consumers.232 Providers need courts to view their procedures as 
fair, and businesses want assurances that courts will respect a provider’s rules and 
enforce awards issued by its arbitrators.233 Thus, providers may file amicus briefs 
defending their procedures,234 and they may adjust their procedures in response to 
judicial criticism.235 These are investments in reputation; to a judge familiar with 
                                                                                                                
services may reduce transaction costs). In “non-administered” arbitration, the parties and the 
arbitrator may handle case logistics, and the provider’s role, if it has one, may be limited to 
helping select an arbitrator or ruling on challenges to the arbitrator. 
230. See Reuben, supra note 89, at 1063–64 (also noting subtle incentives that 
may cause arbitrators to favor institutional players). In collections cases, in which 
consumers are respondents, there may be particular cause for concern. Given the modest 
stakes in many collections cases, few consumer debtors are likely to be represented by 
repeat-player lawyers, see supra note 82, and this many enhance businesses’ ability to shape 
the arbitration process. 
231. For example, JAMS, a major ADR provider, recently retracted a policy 
generally viewed as favorable to class arbitration, replacing it with one similar to the 
AAA’s. See Meredith W. Nissen, Class Action Arbitrations, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 
2005, at 19; Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Reaffirms Commitment to Neutrality Through 
Withdrawal of Class Action Arbitration Waiver Policy (Mar. 10, 2005) (on file with 
author); see also supra note 128. 
232. Courts routinely police the fairness of arbitration agreements, most often 
through state-law unconscionability doctrine, but also when deciding whether to confirm or 
vacate an arbitration award. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that agreement that, among other things, prevented consumer from bringing class 
action was unconscionable); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 
1999) (refusing to enforce agreement that required employee to pay half of arbitration 
expenses); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same, 
where agreement required employee to pay arbitrator’s fee); see also Susan Randall, 
Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. 
REV. 185, 222 (2004) (generally describing and critiquing courts’ application of 
unconscionability doctrine to police arbitration agreements). 
233. See Drahozal, supra note 104, at 752, 769–70; Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, 
Creating a Market for Justice; A Market Incentive Solution to Regulating the Playing Field: 
Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in Online Consumer 
Arbitration, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 27 (2002). 
234. E.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280–81 
(1995) (noting that AAA had filed an amicus brief); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American 
Arbitration Ass’n, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No. 99-
1235), 2000 WL 744161. 
235. See AAA Reduces Arbitration Costs to Be Paid by Employees, 57 DISP. 
RESOL. J., Jan. 2003, at 5 (noting that AAA had reduced cost of arbitration to employees and 
that change was in response to recent court decisions); Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, 
Affordable Justice Through Arbitration: A Critique of Public Citizen’s Jeremiad on the 
“Costs of Arbitration,” 57 DISP. RESOL. J., Jan. 2003, at 8, 11–12 (noting provider trend 
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an ADR provider, designation of that provider in a contract may signal that the 
agreement should be upheld.236 This dialogue between courts and providers, 
moreover, is a two-way street. Provider rules and due process protocols inform 
courts about best practices in arbitration, and courts may come to view the absence 
of these practices as a warning sign.237 Over time, this dialogue may limit contract 
drafters’ efforts to impose procedures that conflict with those “reputable” 
providers view as fundamental to a fair arbitration process.238 
As others have noted, moreover, providers and businesses are subject to a 
variety of external constraints that, over time, may lead to arbitration reform. 
Pressure from the plaintiffs’ bar, for example, may lead ADR providers to reform 
arbitration procedures.239 And consumers themselves may create pressure for 
reform. Businesses and providers that resist needed reform might suffer 
reputational consequences.240 As an initial matter, one might think employers more 
sensitive to reputational concerns than businesses engaged in consumer 
transactions.241 Moreover, consumers may have less information about businesses’ 
practices than employees do about the practices of their employers. In the 
workplace, information about the employer’s dispute resolution process may 
spread easily among employees.242 By contrast, information may spread less easily 
                                                                                                                
towards reduced cost). 
236. See, e.g., Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1318 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (“The rules of the American Arbitration Association . . . are generally regarded 
to be neutral and fair.”); Veliz v. Cintas Corp., No. C 03-1180 SBA, 2004 WL 2452851, at 
*15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2004) (rejecting challenge to confidentiality requirement under AAA 
rules: “The AAA is a reputable arbitration body and the reasons for confidentiality are 
designed to protect all parties in a dispute”); see also Drahozal, supra note 104, at 752 (“An 
institution that develops a reputation for unfairness or biased arbitrators risks losing 
credibility, which courts rely on to recognize and enforce arbitral awards.”). 
237. See Harding, supra note 223, at 409 (“[A]t a minimum, the protocols have 
influenced, to some degree, both the manner in which arbitration agreements are evaluated 
and the development of the common law regarding the conditions that must be met for a 
court to compel arbitration.”). 
238. Cf. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(noting testimony and amicus briefs by ADR providers criticizing as unfair the arbitration 
process structured by the employer). 
239. E.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of 
Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 399 (2005) (noting role of plaintiffs’ employment 
lawyers in shaping arbitration law and practices); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 41–43 
(describing threatened boycott of ADR providers by the employment plaintiffs’ bar and 
creation of resulting employment arbitration due process protocol); David S. Schwartz, 
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in 
an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 41 n.19 (attributing development of 
employment due process protocol to pressure from plaintiffs’ employment bar); Margaret 
A. Jacobs, Firms With Policies Requiring Arbitration Are Facing Obstacles, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 16, 1995, at B5 (describing potential boycott of ADR providers). 
240. See Drahozal, supra note 104, at 767–69. 
241. See id. at 768–69. 
242. If the employer hopes to use arbitration and other ADR tools to resolve 
disputes quickly and with little acrimony—preserving workplace morale and minimizing 
employee turnover, see Sherwyn et al., supra note 27, at 1579; see also supra note 107—it 
will not help to have employees quickly discover that the employer has stacked the deck in 
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among dispersed consumers.243 Yet new technologies and increased interest among 
consumers and advocacy groups are facilitating information exchange244 and 
enabling campaigns to pressure businesses and arbitration providers.245 To date, 
most of these efforts have focused on eliminating pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements altogether, sometimes successfully.246 Consumer groups might have 
similar success advocating for reforms to existing arbitration practices. 
But focusing on the need for consumers to force arbitral reform, or courts 
to impose it, may overlook a fundamental point about how arbitration procedure 
evolves. Ultimately, there may be limits to the ability of businesses and other 
repeat players to control the evolution of arbitration procedure. Instead, to a 
significant degree those procedures may evolve over time through the combined 
influence of ADR providers, arbitrators, and lawyers.247 This process may result in 
the widespread adoption of a reasonably uniform and fair set of procedures even in 
transactions between parties of unequal bargaining power.248 
III. CONCLUSION 
By aggregating claims in formal and informal ways, one-shot claimants 
enhance their ability to compete in litigation with their repeat-player adversaries. 
In what I have called the individuation critique, skeptics assert that arbitration does 
not permit such aggregation. While arbitration proponents defend arbitration for 
independent reasons, such as economic efficiency, they do not suggest that 
arbitration could or should facilitate aggregate dispute resolution. Thus, both sides 
of the debate view arbitration as an individuated disputing process. 
This shared view of arbitration takes too much for granted. As an 
empirical matter, it is not clear whether the individuation critique accurately 
describes current arbitration practices. Perhaps more importantly, neither side of 
the arbitration debate gives much thought to arbitration’s potential to facilitate 
aggregate dispute resolution. This is unfortunate, for arbitration has a good deal of 
                                                                                                                
its favor. 
243. See Drahozal, supra note 104, at 769. 
244. See id. at 768. 
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See FANNIE MAE, ANNOUNCEMENT 04-06, at 4–5 (2004), available at 
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potential. In class arbitration, arbitrators have the flexibility to resolve, in fair, 
efficient, and collective terms, disputes that would have to proceed individually in 
court. Arbitrators should recognize and use this authority, and courts should 
respect it. Even in individual cases, arbitration has the potential to facilitate the 
informal aggregation of disputes. As currently practiced, arbitration may create 
precedent in a variety of ways and offers consumers and employees some 
protection from a variety of oppressive terms. Appropriate reforms might 
strengthen these features of arbitration and offer additional benefits not available 
in court, such as simplified, low-cost collection of awards.249 
Both proponents and skeptics have reason to embrace arbitration’s 
aggregative potential, especially but not exclusively in consumer disputes. For 
proponents, the creation of such a system would further legitimize arbitration, 
demonstrating its capacity to provide justice on even terms and increasing support 
for arbitration among consumers, consumer advocates, and plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
Skeptics, too, should recognize the promise of arbitration and advocate for reforms 
to enhance its aggregative potential. Accomplishing such reforms, however, may 
require more than a broadside attack on pre-dispute arbitration itself. That such 
attacks have been staples of consumer advocates and private lawyers is perhaps 
unsurprising. These actors share a justified suspicion that businesses do not 
implement arbitration programs as a service to their customers. Objections to 
consumer arbitration in particular also reflect a concern for the future of the class 
action. Yet however justified, these concerns should not lead us to reject pre-
dispute arbitration out-of-hand, nor to cease efforts to influence the evolution of 
arbitration procedure. Potentially, arbitration may prove superior to the courts as a 
forum for resolving many consumer disputes. Consumers may benefit most if we 
recognize the possibilities as well as the dangers of arbitration. 
                                                                                                                
249. See supra text accompanying notes 214–218. As I have described, ADR 
provider rules have gradually become more favorable to consumer and employee claimants. 
For example, in addition to gradually reducing the cost of arbitration, see Estreicher & 
Ballard, supra note 235, at 11–12; see also supra text accompanying note 117, ADR 
providers may now (1) require that arbitration agreements be mutually binding, see JAMS 
CONSUMER POLICY, supra note 115, para. 1; JAMS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, supra note 115, 
Standard No. 7; (2) require that businesses waive contract terms requiring arbitration in an 
inconvenient forum, see supra note 118 and accompanying text; (3) decline arbitrations 
under agreements that limit the remedies available in arbitration, see supra note 124–126 
and accompanying text; (4) make awards publicly available, see supra notes 199–200 and 
accompanying text; and (5) require reasoned opinions, see supra note 199. 
